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FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND FIDUCIARY OUTS
Julian Velasco*
INTRODUCTION
At the intersection of contract law and fiduciary duties in corporate law
lies the fiduciary out. Generally speaking, a fiduciary out is a provision in an
acquisition agreement which allows the target company's board of directors
not to comply with some, or all, of the directors' obligations under the agree-
ment if it is necessary for them to avoid a breach of fiduciary duties.' Despite
its ubiquity in acquisition agreements, the fiduciary out is almost unheard of
in any other context because it is a problematic provision. 2
The fiduciary out creates a dilemma with significant stakes on both
sides. On the one hand, there is the interest of a third party-the acquirer-
who has negotiated a contract with the target's board of directors. Not sur-
prisingly, the acquirer expects compliance with the terms of the contract. On
the other hand, there is the interest of the shareholders who rely on directors
to pursue their interests. The sale of a company can be in the interests of its
shareholders, but only if they receive adequate consideration. Presumably,
directors will assure themselves of this fact before they approve the transac-
tion. However, skepticism is appropriate "[b]ecause of the omnipresent spec-
ter that a board may be acting primarily in its own interests, rather than those
of the corporation and its shareholders."3 Moreover, because there is a delay
between the signing of the acquisition agreement and the closing of the trans-
action, a superior offer often will present itself. The question then arises-
Associate Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School. J.D., 1994, Columbia University; B.S.,
1991, Georgetown University. This paper was presented at the 2013 Fiduciary Law Workshop. I would
like to thank Amy Barrett, Matthew Barrett, Collecn Baker, Christopher Bruner, Ronald Colombo, Evan
Criddle, Evan Fox-Decent, Tamar Frankel, Andrew Gold, Paul Miller, and John Robinson for their helpful
comments and suggestions, and James Huang, Mauri Miller, Gracme Quinn, and Chris Rapking for their
excellent research assistance.
1 See Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 945 (Dcl. 2003) (Veasey, C.J., dis-
senting) ("What is the practical import of a 'fiduciary out?' It is a contractual provision, articulated in a
manner to be negotiated, that would permit the board of the corporation being acquired to exit without
breaching the merger agreement in the event of a superior offer."); see also William T. Allen, Under-
standing Fiduciary Outs: The What and the Why ofan Anomalous Concept, 55 BUS. LAW. 653, 653 (2000)
("Fiduciary outs are anomalous contract provisions that generally provide an escape hatch to a target
corporation from performing some contractual undertaking meant to advance the closing of an acquisition
agreement.").
2 Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 939 n.88 ("Other contracts do not require a fiduciary out clause because
they involve business judgments that are within the exclusive province of the board of directors' power to
manage the affairs of the corporation.").
3 Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985).
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whose interest shall prevail? The acquirer's expectation interest in the con-
tract requires that the transaction proceed as planned, notwithstanding the
emergence of a superior offer. The shareholders' reliance interest in fiduciary
duties requires that directors pursue the best value reasonably available,
which would be the superior offer. In this zero-sum game, both interests can-
not prevail.
The dilemma is complicated and under-theorized in the scholarly liter-
ature. This Article considers the issue in depth. It argues that the fiduciary
out is a deeply problematic device because, although the intent is that it
should be exercised only when absolutely necessary, it inevitably operates as
a discretionary option on the part of target directors. Nevertheless, the Article
concludes that fiduciary outs are viable in the unique context of acquisition
agreements but should not be extended to other contexts.
Part I explores the purpose of fiduciary duties in corporate law to set the
stage for an understanding of fiduciary outs. It argues that fiduciary duties
exist solely to protect the beneficiaries (i.e., the shareholders) from abuse at
the hands of the fiduciaries (i.e., the directors)-and not to protect them
against third parties or bad outcomes. Part II analyzes the concept of the fi-
duciary out in this light. It argues that fiduciary outs are essentially contrac-
tual proxies for fiduciary duties, and as such also exist to protect shareholders
from director misconduct rather than to ensure good substantive outcomes.
Part III uses this understanding to explore the interpretation of fiduciary out
clauses. It argues that fiduciary outs almost necessarily transform acquisition
agreements into options at the hands of the target directors, with the effect of
protecting shareholders from bad outcomes at the expense of the acquirer.
Such provisions are therefore deeply problematic. Part IV analyzes fiduciary
outs in the unique context of acquisition agreements. It argues that, notwith-
standing the general concerns, fiduciary outs are appropriate in acquisition
agreements because they protect the shareholders in the exercise of their right
to vote against a transaction from abuse at the hands of directors who might
try to force the transaction upon shareholders. In addition, this Part explains
how the much-pilloried case of Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc.4 can
be justified in this light. Finally, Part V explores fiduciary outs in other con-
texts. It argues that they are not appropriate outside of the acquisition agree-
ment context because there is no similar need to protect shareholders from
directors. This Part also explains how the case of CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Em-
ployees Pension Plan' seriously erred in trying to import fiduciary outs into
an analysis of corporate bylaws.
4 818 A.2d 914 (Dcl. 2003).
5 953 A.2d 227 (Dcl. 2008).
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I. THE PURPOSE OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES
What is a fiduciary duty? It is not so much a special type of duty as it is
a duty imposed in a special kind of relationship.6 A fiduciary relationship is
a legally recognized relationship in which one is given power over the inter-
ests of another, who thereby becomes vulnerable to abuse. Although such
relationships are risky, they can also be very beneficial. In order to encourage
and police such relationships, the law imposes a duty on the first party-the
fiduciary-to act in the interests of the second party-the beneficiary (who
is often, but not always, the entrustor, or the party who granted the power to
the first'). Thus, the raison d'tre of fiduciary duties, and of the designation
of relationships as fiduciary, is the protection of the beneficiary from abuse
at the hands of the fiduciary.'
Section A reviews the general principles of fiduciary law to establish
the nature of fiduciary relationships. It shows that there is a general consen-
sus that fiduciary duties exist for the protection of the beneficiary from the
fiduciary. Section B looks at the nature of fiduciary duties in corporate law
specifically. It describes the specific implementation of fiduciary law princi-
ples that are embodied in corporate law fiduciary duties.
A. Fiduciary Law Generally
Fiduciary law is not generally considered to be a separate and distinct
body of law in the United States. Rather, many different areas of law employ
fiduciary law principles. Among the most common are agency law, trust law,
6 See Paul B. Miller, Justifying Fiduciary Duties, 58 MCGILL L.J. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript
at I1), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-2083855 ("The conventional position is that fiduciary duties
arise upon the establishment of a fiduciary relationship.").
7 It is worth noting that I am using the term "entrustor" slightly differently than does Professor
Tamar Frankel, who coined the term. See Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 795, 800 n. 17
(1983). As I use the term, for example, the "entrustor" would be the settlor rather than the beneficiary in
trust law.
8 See P. D. FINN, FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS 3 (1977) ("[Fiduciary] duties ensure that when a dcci-
sion is taken it is in fact taken by the fiduciary, that it is taken because he believes it should be taken, and
that it is taken in the interests of his beneficiaries."); TAMAR FRANKEL, FIDUCIARY LAW 108 (2011) [here-
inafter FRANKEL, FIDUCIARY LAW] ("The duty of loyalty supports the main purpose of fiduciary law: to
prohibit fiduciaries from misappropriating or misusing entrusted property or power."); Frankel, supra note
7, at 824 ("[Mluch of fiduciary law is designed to prevent the fiduciary from using delegated power to
further interests other than those of the entrustor."); Miller, supra note 6 (manuscript at 62) ("Given that
fiduciary power is a means of the beneficiary, the interaction between fiduciary and beneficiary must be
presumptively conducted for the sole advantage of the beneficiary."); D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Re-
source Theory of Fiduciary Law, 55 VAND. L. REv. 1399, 1402 (2002) ("[T]he duty of loyalty that is the
essence of fiduciary duty protects beneficiaries against opportunistic behavior by fiduciaries.").
2013] 159
160 GEO. MASON L. REV. [VOL. 21:1
corporate law (and the law of other business entities), the Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act, and professional practice. Each implements the
principles of fiduciary law in different ways. Thus, it is difficult to make very
many claims about fiduciary law in general.
For example, scholars do not agree on the source of fiduciary law-
whether it is based on property,9 contracts, 0 morality," or some other foun-
dation.12 In fact, many scholars are skeptical about whether fiduciary law can
be adequately defined. Some scholars, such as Professor Deborah DeMott,
come to this conclusion reluctantly. She acknowledges that "fiduciary obli-
gation eludes theoretical capture" 4 and admits that "[o]ne could justifiably
conclude that the law of fiduciary obligation is in significant respects atom-
istic."'5 Judge Frank J. Easterbrook and Professor Daniel R. Fischel, on the
other hand, are much less reluctant. According to them, "[s]cholars ... have
had trouble coming up with a unifying approach to fiduciary duties because
they are looking for the wrong things. They are looking for something special
9 This is implicit in the work of Adolf Berlc and Gardiner Means. See., e.g., ADOLF A. BERLE, JR.
& GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 221, 226-27 (reprt. 1933)
(1932) (describing the source of fiduciary duties within corporations); A. A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers
as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049, 1071-72 (1931) (discussing the fiduciary relationship be-
tween directors and shareholders); see also Larry E. Ribstein, Are Partners Fiduciaries?, 2005 U. ILL. L.
REV. 209, 212 (arguing "that default fiduciary duties should be confined to relationships that involve the
contractual delegation of broad power over one's property").
10 See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L. & ECON.
425, 426-27 (1993) ("[Fiduciary duties are] a response to the impossibility of writing contracts completely
specifying the parties' obligations.. . . Instead of specific undertakings, the agent assumes a duty of loyalty
in pursuit of the objective and a duty of care in performance. . . . Fiduciary duties are not special duties;
they have no moral footing; they are the same sort of obligations, derived and enforced in the same way,
as other contractual undertakings.").
11 See, e.g., Robert Flannigan, The Fiduciary Obligation, 9 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 285, 310
(1989) (fiduciary duties exist "for the singular purpose of maintaining the integrity of trusting relation-
ships"); Frankel, supra note 7, at 830 ("[O]nce a person becomes a fiduciary, the law places him in the
role of a moral person and pressures him to behave in a selfless fashion, to think and act for others.").
12 See, e.g., MATTHEW CONAGLEN, FIDUCIARY LOYALTY 4 (2010) ("[T]he fiduciary concept of
'loyalty' is a convenient encapsulation of a series of legal principles .. . [that] provide[s] a subsidiary and
prophylactic form of protection for non-fiduciary duties."); Gareth Jones, Unjust Enrichment and the Fi-
duciary's Duty of Loyalty, 84 LAW Q. REV. 472, 472 (1968) (arguing that the source of fiduciary law is
unjust enrichment); Miller, supra note 6 (manuscript at 42-67) (proposing a juridical justification for fi-
duciary duties).
13 See Deborah A. DeMott, Breach of Fiduciary Duty: On Justilable Expectations of Loyalty and
Their Consequences, 48 ARIz. L. REV. 925, 934-36 (2006) (illustrating that the applications of fiduciary
duties arc "too varied" to extrapolate one distinct definition).
14 Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligations, 1988 DUKE L.J.
879, 908 (1988).
15 Id. at 915.
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about fiduciary relations. There is nothing special to find."'6 Other scholars
have expressed variations on these sentiments. 7
Nevertheless, there is agreement on the most basic concepts of fiduciary
law. This is evident in the attempts made by various scholars to synthesize
fiduciary law into something resembling a definition. Consider the following
examples. Professor Tamar Frankel, one of the leading scholars in the field
of fiduciary law, has observed that, "[w]hile the definitions of fiduciaries [in
the various areas of law] are not identical, all definitions share three main
elements: (1) entrustment of property or power, (2) entrustors' trust of fidu-
ciaries, and (3) risk to the entrustors emanating from the entrustment."'" Pro-
fessor DeMott believes that "[t]he defining or determining criterion [for a
fiduciary relationship] should be whether the plaintiff (or claimed beneficiary
of a fiduciary duty) would be justified in expecting loyal conduct on the part
of an actor and whether the actor's conduct contravened that expecta-
tion." 9According to Professor D. Gordon Smith, "fiduciary relationships
form when one party ... acts on behalf of another party ... while exercising
discretion with respect to a critical resource belonging to the [other]."2O J.C.
Shepherd claims that "[a] fiduciary relationship exists whenever any person
acquires a power of any type on condition that he also receive with it a duty
to utilize that power in the best interests of another, and the recipient of the
power uses that power."2' Finally, Professor Paul Miller argues that "[a] fi-
duciary relationship is one in which one party (the fiduciary) exercises dis-
cretionary power over the significant practical interests of another (the ben-
eficiary)."22
Although these accounts vary, they paint a very similar picture. In their
generality, these definitions may not describe exactly who will and will not
be considered a fiduciary, but they do tell us a good deal about fiduciary
relationships. At its core, a fiduciary relationship is one in which one party-
the fiduciary-is trusted with power over the interests of another-the bene-
ficiary-who becomes vulnerable as a result.
What flows from the recognition of a fiduciary relationship? Again,
there is significant agreement on this question. The law imposes upon fidu-
ciaries a special obligation-a duty to act in the interests of the beneficiary.
16 Eastcrbrook & Fischel, supra note 10, at 438.
17 See, e.g., Frankel, supra note 7, at 797 ("It could be argued that ... [tihe differences among
fiduciaries may be so great that treating them as a group would require a very high level of generality,
rendering a unified examination of little use."); see also L. S. Scaly, Fiduciary Relationships, 1962
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 69, 73 ("The word 'fiduciary,' we find, is not definitive of a single class of relationships
to which a fixed set of rules and principles apply.").
18 FRANKEL, FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 8, at 4.
19 DeMott, supra note 13, at 936.
20 Smith, supra note 8, at 1402 (emphasis omitted).
21 J. C. SHEPHERD, THE LAW OF FIDUCIARIES 35 (1981).
22 Miller, supra note 6 (manuscript at 51).
2013] 161
GEO. MASON L. REv.
The exact nature of this "fiduciary duty" may vary depending upon the par-
ticular context, but the general contours are clear.
At the very least, there is a duty of loyalty.23 With respect to the fiduciary
relationship, a fiduciary may not act counter to the interests of the benefi-
ciary. In fact, fiduciaries must avoid conflicts of interest that might tempt
them to act against the interests of the beneficiary.2 4 Of course, a lot more can
be said about the duty of loyalty, especially in particular areas of law. While
the specifics may vary, however, the general principle is the same. 25 A fidu-
ciary must use his power for the benefit of the beneficiary, and not for his
own benefit or for the benefit of others.
There are some who argue that the duty of loyalty is the only true fidu-
ciary duty.26 However, that is a controversial claim. Almost equal in pedigree
and stature to the duty of loyalty is the duty of care. A fiduciary must act (i.e.,
perform the service in question) diligently, exercising an appropriate level of
care and skill.27 Exactly what this definition means will depend upon the
given context, but the general concept remains fairly constant.
Other fiduciary duties are less universal, and more contextual. For ex-
ample, in corporate law there is a duty of good faith. 28 In the law of nonprofit
organizations, there is a duty of obedience. 29 Other duties could be enumer-
ated. In each case, the law protects the beneficiary from abuse at the hands
of the fiduciary, in whatever form that abuse might take.
Although it is possible to consider care, loyalty, good faith, and obedi-
ence to be separate fiduciary duties, the better view is that they are interre-
lated. As Professors Claire Hill and Brett McDonnell have argued in the cor-
porate law context, fiduciary duties can be understood at different levels of
23 See id at 9 & n. 16 ("At the core lies the cardinal fiduciary duty of loyalty."); see also Leo E.
Strine, Jr. ct al., Loyalty's Core Demand The Defining Role ofGood Faith in Corporation Law, 98 GEO.
L.J. 629, 633 (2010) ("[T]he duty of loyalty has, for good reason, been central to Delaware's approach to
corporate law.").
24 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 8.01-05 (2006).
25 See WARREN A. SEAVEY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF AGENCY 4 (1964) ("The duties of loyalty
arc substantially the same for all fiduciaries, varying only in intensity.").
26 See, e.g., CONAGLEN, supra note 12, at 39-44 (arguing that "duties of care [and good faith] are
not peculiar to fiduciaries and so do not merit consideration as 'fiduciary' duties"); Christopher M. Bruner,
Is the Corporate Director's Duty of Care a "Fiduciary" Duty? Does It Matter? 2, 9 (Washington & Lee
Legal Studies, Paper No. 2013-14, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-2237400; Miller, supra
note 6 (manuscript at 9); Smith, supra note 8, at 1409.
27 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.08 (2006).
28 See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 64 (Del. 2006) (recognizing the
importance of the duty of good faith in corporate law); Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter,
911 A.2d 362, 367-70 (Del. 2006) (discussing duty of good faith).
29 See, e.g., Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp. v. Spitzer, 715 N.Y.S.2d 575, 593 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1999) ("[D]irector[s] of a not-for-profit corporation [must] 'be faithful to the purposes and goals of the
organization,' [because] 'nonprofit corporations are defined by their specific objectives . . . .').
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abstraction.30 At the highest level of abstraction, there is only one fiduciary
duty: to pursue the interests of the beneficiary.' At lower levels of abstrac-
tion, there can be any number of fiduciary duties. Thus the duty of care rep-
resents the duty to pursue the interests of the beneficiary carefully; the duty
of loyalty represents the duty to pursue the interests of the beneficiary loy-
ally; and so on, for other duties.32 Both views, along with other views at dif-
ferent levels of abstraction, have an equal claim to the truth.33
The most general level of abstraction most clearly reveals the true nature
of fiduciary duties. Fiduciary duties are obligations imposed upon fiduciaries
to require them to use the powers at their disposal to pursue the interests of
the beneficiaries, at least with respect to the relationship. 4 The duty of loyalty
protects beneficiaries from self-dealing, while the duty of care protects ben-
eficiaries from shirking. Likewise, it could be said that the duty of good faith
protects beneficiaries from intentional misconduct and that the duty of obe-
dience protects beneficiaries from disobedience. Both generally and in each
case, the purpose of fiduciary duties is to protect beneficiaries from abuse at
the hands of the fiduciary.35
It is equally important to note at this point what fiduciary law is not
about. It is not about protecting beneficiaries from third parties, nor is it about
protecting beneficiaries from bad outcomes. Fiduciary duties are duties im-
posed upon fiduciaries to ensure that they act in the interests of the benefi-
ciary, nothing more.3 6 To be sure, entrustors seek out fiduciary relationships
in order to secure good results. Generally, the fiduciary is an expert who can
be expected to do a better job than the entrustor or beneficiary could do for
himself. Thus, fiduciary relationships have the goal of enhancing beneficiary
welfare. However, it is the fiduciary's skill that must secure good results, not
fiduciary duties. There is no fiduciary duty to guarantee good outcomes."
30 See Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Essay, Stone v. Ritter and the Expanding Duty of
Loyalty, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1769, 1788-89 (2007) (discussing the levels of abstraction of fiduciary
duties).
31 Compare id. (placing beneficiary interests at the highest level of abstraction), with Strine et al.,
supra note 23, at 635 ("[Ilt is possible to conceive of there being only one core duty.").
32 See Julian Velasco, How Many Fiduciary Duties Are There in Corporate Law?, 83 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1231, 1301 (2010).
3 See id. at 1287-88 (explaining how multiple viewpoints are simultaneously correct).
34 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 (2006).
35 Velasco, supra note 32, at 1301 ("Ultimately, there is one fundamental fiduciary duty-to pursue
the interests of the corporation and its shareholdcrs-but that core duty can be divided into ... different
concerns.").
36 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
3 Cf Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000) ("Courts do not measure, weigh or quantify
directors' judgments. We do not even decide if they are reasonable in this context. Due care in the deci-
sionmaking context is process due care only. Irrationality is the outer limit of the business judgment rule.
Irrationality may be the functional equivalent of the waste test or it may tend to show that the decision is
not made in good faith, which is a key ingredient of the business judgment rule." (footnotes omitted)); In
re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996) ("[Wlhether a ... decision
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Along the same lines, it is important to draw a distinction between fidu-
ciary duties and the powers exercised by fiduciaries. Fiduciary duties are not
themselves powers."8 The powers that the fiduciary has in a fiduciary rela-
tionship are those that the entrustor (or, in some cases, other substantive
law39) has given to it. Fiduciary duties, on the other hand, are obligations
imposed by equity to ensure that the fiduciary's powers are not abused. Thus,
fiduciary duties are not themselves powers, nor even extensions of power. To
the contrary, they are limitations upon the discretionary use of otherwise le-
gitimate powers.
B. Corporate Law Fiduciary Duties
Corporate law provides a classic example of fiduciary law principles.
Shareholders are the owners of the corporation, but often they cannot manage
it. This fact is most evident in large, public corporations where there are thou-
sands of dispersed shareholders. Shareholders hire expert managers to run
the business on their behalf. This arrangement is commonly referred to as the
separation of ownership and control.40 Under this arrangement, shareholders
are the entrustors and beneficiaries, and the managers are the fiduciaries.
Corporate law mandates that "[t]he business and affairs of every corpo-
ration ... shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of direc-
tors." 4 1 Thus, in a sense, directors' powers can be said to be "original and
undelegated." 42 However, this is only part of the story. Corporate law is also
clear that directors have fiduciary duties toward "the corporation and its
shareholders." 43 Clearly, directors are not mere agents; they must exercise
[is] substantively wrong, or degrees of wrong extending through 'stupid' to 'egregious' or 'irrational,'
provides no ground for director liability, so long as the court determines that the process employed was
either rational or employed in a good faith effort to advance corporate interests." (emphasis omitted)); id.
at 968 ("If the shareholders thought themselves entitled to some other quality of judgment than such a
director produces in the good faith exercise of the powers of office, then the shareholders should have
elected other directors.").
38 But see infra note 358 and accompanying text (discussing CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pen-
sion Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 240 (Dcl. 2008)).
3 See Miller, supra note 6 (manuscript at 15) ("Fiduciary relationships may alternatively be estab-
lished by non-contractual agreement, by unilateral undertaking, or by legislative or judicial decree.").
40 See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 9, at 277-87.
41 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2011).
42 See N. Assur. Co. v. Rachlin Clothes Shop, Inc., 125 A. 184, 188 (Del. 1924) (quoting Hoyt v.
Thompson's Ex'r, 19 N.Y. 207, 216 (1859)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Manson v. Cur-
tis, 119 N.E. 559, 562 (N.Y. 1918).
43 See N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found. v. Ghecwalla, 930 A.2d 92, 101 (Dcl. 2007)
("Delaware corporate law provides for a separation of control and ownership. The directors of Delaware
corporations have 'the legal responsibility to manage the business of a corporation for the benefit of its
shareholders owners.' Accordingly, fiduciary duties are imposed upon the directors to regulate their con-
duct when they perform that function." (footnotes omitted)); ACE Ltd. v. Capital Re Corp., 747 A.2d 95,
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their independent business judgment." However, they must always pursue
the interests of the shareholders.
In corporate law, the two main fiduciary duties are the duty of care and
the duty of loyalty.45 The duty of care focuses on the decision-making pro-
cess.46 "[D]irectors of a corporation in managing the corporate affairs are
bound to use that amount of care which ordinarily careful and prudent men
would use in similar circumstances." 47 More specifically, "directors have a
duty to inform themselves, prior to making a business decision, of all material
information reasonably available to them. Having become so informed, they
must then act with requisite care in the discharge of their duties." 48 The duty
of loyalty, on the other hand, is concerned primarily with conflicts of interest.
"Corporate officers and directors are not permitted to use their position of
trust and confidence to further their private interests. .. . The rule that re-
quires an undivided and unselfish loyalty to the corporation demands that
there shall be no conflict between duty and self-interest." 49
In recent years, a third duty-the duty of good faith-has risen in prom-
inence. At one point, Delaware courts elevated this duty to be considered part
of a triad of fiduciary duties (along with care and loyalty), 0 but more recently
it has been demoted to a subset of the duty of loyalty.' I have argued that it
does not make sense to consider good faith to be a subset of loyalty because
they are motivated by entirely different concerns.52 Regardless of its meta-
physical stature, it is clear that the duty of good faith is concerned with the
fiduciary's subjective intent."3
As I have argued elsewhere, it is reasonable to say that there are two
other fiduciary duties that can be uncovered in Delaware case law. 14There is
109 (Del. Ch. 1999) ("Delaware law invests a substantial amount of authority in corporate boards to man-
age the affairs of corporations. But this investment of authority is dependent on the corresponding respon-
sibility of corporate boards to exercise this authority in a careful and loyal manner.").
44 See People ex rel. Manice v. Powell, 94 N.E. 634, 637 (N.Y. 1911); cf Grimes v. Donald, 673
A.2d 1207, 1214 (Del. 1996) (explaining that directors cannot abdicate responsibilities for managing busi-
ness), overruled on other grounds by Brchm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 255 (Del. 2000).
45 See Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369-70 (Del. 2006).
46 See Brehm, 746 A.2d at 264.
47 Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963); see also MODEL Bus. CORP.
ACT ANN. § 8.30(b) (Supp. 1998/99).
48 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984), overruled on other grounds by Brehm, 746
A.2d at 254.
49 Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939).
50 See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993), modified, 636 A.2d 956
(Del. 1994).
51 See Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369-70 (Del. 2006).
52 See Velasco, supra note 32, at 1285-96.
53 See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27,67 (Del. 2006) (citing In re Walt Disney
Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 755-56 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff'd, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006)); Stone, 911
A.2d at 369.
54 See Velasco, supra note 32, at 1288-93.
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a duty of "objectivity," requiring directors to avoid being influenced by their
personal biases-even if those biases cannot fairly be considered a conflict
of interest that rises to the level of self-dealing." This duty is evident from
the cases involving structural bias, such as takeover defenses 6 and derivative
litigation." More controversially, but also grounded in case law, is the duty
of "rationality."" Ostensibly, at least, this duty is concerned with the actual
substance of a business decision and its defensibility. Arguably, though, it is
simply a proxy for good faith."
If Professors Hill and McDonnell are correct, and fiduciary duties can
be understood at various levels of abstraction, then it is fair to say that there
is ultimately just one fiduciary duty-to pursue the interests of the sharehold-
ers-and that these three to five specific duties are merely aspects of the one
general fiduciary duty.
In other words, the duty of care represents the concern that the directors pursue the interests of
the corporation and its shareholders carefully; the duty of loyalty represents the concern that
they do so loyally (without conflicts); the duty of objectivity represents the concern that they
do so reasonably (despite bias); the duty of good faith represents the concern that they do so
honestly (without misconduct); and the duty of rationality represents the concern that they do
so rationally (without waste).
60
At least in corporate law, however, it is not enough to enumerate the
various fiduciary duties because they are not enforced in a straightforward
manner. Failure to satisfy fiduciary duties does not automatically lead to lia-
bility for a director, because corporate law is characterized by a pervasive
divergence between standards of conduct and standards of review.6' A stand-
ard of conduct is the rule as directed toward actors, telling them what they
must do; a standard of review is the rule as directed toward judges, telling
them how they should evaluate the actors' conduct.62 In many areas of law,
the two types of standards coincide; in corporate law, they do not. For various
reasons, the standards of review in corporate law are significantly lower than
the standards of conduct. Thus, it is fair to say that directors will not be held
55 See id. at 1291-92.
56 See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985).
57 See, e.g., Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 780 (Del.), order rev'd, 430 A.2d 779 (Del.
1981).
58 See Velasco, supra note 32, at 1290-96.
59 See id at 1252-56.
60 Seeid.at 1301.
61 See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards of Review
in Corporate Law, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 437 (1993).
62 See id at 437; see also Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Sepa-
ration in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REv. 625, 627 (1984).
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liable for simple breaches of fiduciary duty-only for more egregious
breaches. 63
The root of this divergence is the business judgment rule. According to
Delaware courts, the business judgment rule "is a presumption that in making
a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis,
in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best
interests of the company." 4 This presumption is very strong and cannot be
rebutted easily,65 resulting in a divergence between standards of conduct and
standards of review.
Alternatively, the business judgment rule can be characterized as a
standard of review.6 6 "[U]nder the business judgment rule director liability is
predicated upon concepts of gross negligence."6 Thus, while the duty of care
may require that directors act with ordinary care (i.e., avoid negligence), they
will only be held liable for gross negligence. This principle extends beyond
the duty of care. The duty of loyalty is primarily about avoiding conflicts of
interest.68 However, under the standard of review, directors will not be held
liable despite a conflict of interest if their actions are deemed entirely fair.69
Likewise, the duty of good faith requires subjective good faith on the part of
the director, though directors will only be held liable for intentional miscon-
duct. 0 The same principle holds true for the two additional duties I have pro-
posed." Under the duty of objectivity, directors must not be influenced by
personal biases, but their actions will be upheld notwithstanding structural
bias if they are reasonable. 72 Finally, under the duty of rationality, directors
are expected to make substantively good decisions, but directors will only be
held liable if their decisions are irrational or amount to waste.73
The rationale for this divergence is what I have called the "room for
error" theory. 74 Unlike many other beneficiaries in a fiduciary relationship,
63 See Julian Velasco, The Role of Aspiration in Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 54 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 519, 547 (2012).
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984), overruled on other grounds by Brehm v. Eis-
ner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000).
65 See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993), modified, 636 A.2d 956
(Del. 1994).
66 See Julian Velasco, Structural Bias and the Need for Substantive Review, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 821,
828 & n.18 (2004).
67 Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812.
68 "The duty of loyalty must be understood as the law's attempt to create an incentive structure in
which the fiduciary's self-interest directs her to act in the best interest of the beneficiary." Robert Cooter
& Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its Economic Character and Legal Consequences,
66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045, 1074 (1991).
69 See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983) (describing the entire fairness test).
70 See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 67 (Del. 2006).
71 See Velasco, supra note 32, at 1244-48, 1252-56.
72 See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985).
73 See, e.g., Walt Disney Co., 906 A.2d at 62, 73-75.
74 See Velasco, supra note 63, at 546-53.
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shareholders are willing to accept a significant amount of risk. They under-
stand that, in the business world, risk and return are related. Thus, sharehold-
ers want their directors to take reasonable entrepreneurial risks. However,
directors will be risk-averse if they have to fear personal liability. This ten-
dency is especially true in a large, public corporation, where the damages for
breach of fiduciary duty could exceed director wealth many times over. Any
mistake-whether on their part, in accidentally breaching their fiduciary du-
ties, or on the part of the courts, in erroneously concluding that directors have
breached their fiduciary duties-could lead to ruinous liability. The diver-
gence between standards of conduct and standards of review can provide di-
rectors with a degree of comfort, allowing them to take on healthy entrepre-
neurial risks. It assures them that small mistakes, whether on their part or on
the part of the courts, will not lead to liability.
Notwithstanding these interesting wrinkles in the implementation of fi-
duciary concepts in corporate law, it is important to note that the most basic
principles of fiduciary law remain intact. Directors and shareholders are
clearly in a fiduciary relationship. Directors, as fiduciaries, are obligated to
pursue the interests of the shareholders. Fiduciary duties exist to protect
shareholders from abuse at the hands of directors-whether in the form of
shirking, self-dealing, intentional misconduct, or otherwise. Fiduciary duties
do not exist to protect shareholders from third parties, nor to guarantee good
results. Finally, fiduciary duties are not themselves grants of power, but ra-
ther limits on the directors' ability to exercise the powers they have been
given.
II. FIDUCIARY OUTS
This Part examines fiduciary out provisions more closely. Section A ex-
plores what fiduciary outs are. Section B reviews the reasons for their exist-
ence.
A. What Are Fiduciary Outs?
Conceptually, a fiduciary out is a contractual provision that allows cer-
tain parties to avoid obligations under the contract based on their fiduciary
duties." In practice, fiduciary outs appear in acquisition agreements and pre-
vent the directors of a company from having to breach their fiduciary duties
to the shareholders.76 Generally, fiduciary outs protect only the directors of
the target company.77 Of course, they could apply to both sets of directors.
75 See supra note I and accompanying text.
76 Allen, supra note 1, at 653.
77 Id. at 657.
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However, because acquirers often can enter into acquisition agreements with-
out shareholder approval, there is less need for the protection of a fiduciary
out." Outside of the acquisition context, fiduciary outs are virtually nonex-
istent. 9
Fiduciary outs are contractual in nature and can be structured in many
different ways. For example, the scope of a fiduciary out can be broad or
narrow. A broad provision could allow the directors out of any contractual
obligation, or even the entire agreement. A narrow provision could allow the
directors out of only a specific obligation. Similarly, the trigger can be broad
or narrow. Under a broad provision, directors might be excused whenever
they deem it necessary or appropriate to comply with their fiduciary duties.
Under a narrow provision, directors might be excused only upon the occur-
rence of certain events.
Early on, fiduciary outs were drafted quite broadly. For example, in
Smith v. Van Gorkomo the provision read as follows:
The Board of Directors shall recommend to the stockholders of Trans Union that they approve
and adopt the Merger Agreement ("the stockholders' approval") and to use its best efforts to
obtain the requisite votes therefor. GL acknowledges that Trans Union directors may have a
competing fiduciary obligation to the shareholders under certain circumstances."
78 See supra note 2.
79 But see infra Part V (discussing CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227
(Del. 2008)). Fiduciary outs have also found their way into poison pill policies. See THE CONFERENCE
BOARD, DIRECTOR COMPENSATION AND BOARD PRACTICES: 2013 EDITION, at 100-01 (2013). Generally
speaking, shareholders are opposed to poison pills and often have managed to get companies to adopt
policies in which directors promise not to adopt a poison pill plan without shareholder approval. Some-
times, however, directors include a fiduciary out, "allowing for the adoption of a poison pill without
shareholder approval in those extraordinary circumstances when the company determines it is in the best
interest of shareholders to install a defense without delay." Id. at 101. This practice generally does not
reflect a negotiated agreement and is therefore unrelated to the discussion of fiduciary outs in this Part.
Rather, the practice reflects the directors' determination to retain their discretion to adopt a poison pill
against the wishes of the shareholders. Some directors would argue that such a fiduciary out is required
by law, but the one court that has decided the issue has concluded otherwise. See Unisuper Ltd. v. News
Corp., No. 1699-N, 2005 WL 3529317, at *8-9 (Del. Ch. Dec. 20, 2005). Although the holding in that
case is consistent with the view set forth in this Article, it is not entirely clear, in light of the CA decision,
that the Delaware Supreme Court would reach the same conclusion. However, the issue is beyond the
scope of this Article because it also involves the substantive issue of whether shareholders have the right
to interfere with the directors' adoption of a poison pill. See Account v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 780 A.2d
245, 246 (Del. 2001) (upholding the power of directors to adopt a poison pill without shareholder ap-
proval); see also Julian Velasco, Just Do It: An Antidote to the Poison Pill, 52 EMORY L.J. 849, 851-54
(2003) (describing issue concernmg legitimacy of anti-poison pill bylaws). If shareholders do not have
that right, then fiduciary outs are entirely unnecessary. The issue is relevant only if shareholders do have
the right to interfere. In that case, the position of this Article, set forth especially in Part V, is that fiduciary
outs should not be required in poison pill plans.
80 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), overruled by Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009).
81 Id. at 879.
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This language is so vague that the court could not even accept that it
amounted to a fiduciary out at all.8 2 However, in retrospect, it is fairly clear
that the intent of the parties was to allow the directors a fiduciary out. Without
any specifics, the provision must be interpreted as being very broad-at least
with respect to the trigger, if not the scope.
The problem with broad provisions is that they leave the decision as to
whether the fiduciary out should be exercisable entirely to the discretion of
the target directors, whose interests are not necessarily aligned with those of
the acquirer. Even if the target and acquirer's interests are aligned at the time
they enter into the agreement-a proposition which is debatable-they could
certainly diverge if a superior offer comes along, or if circumstances change
such that not consummating the transaction is preferable for target sharehold-
ers. At that point, the target directors may be tempted to exercise the fiduciary
out opportunistically rather than act in good faith. From the perspective of
the acquirer, this possibility essentially converts the contract into an option
on the part of the target. This outcome would be unacceptable. Narrower pro-
visions are intended to provide the flexibility that is deemed necessary while
limiting the discretion of the directors to an acceptable range.
Over time, practice has converged toward a more narrow approach to
fiduciary outs. The American Bar Association has provided a starting point
for negotiation in its Model Merger Agreement." Many acquisition agree-
ments follow its rough outline.
Arguably, both the scope and the triggers of most contemporary fiduci-
ary outs tend to be on the narrow end of the spectrum. It is common, for
example, for an acquisition agreement to include fiduciary outs for two spe-
cific obligations: the "no solicitation" provision 4 and the shareholder recom-
mendation covenant." It is also common that the trigger is subject to various
conditions, such as the making of a superior offer by a third party. 6 Under
such provisions, directors are not free to decide at any point that their fiduci-
ary duties require them to back out of the agreement. Rather, they are bound
by the agreement generally and are released from key obligations only under
circumstances that implicate their fiduciary duties.
On the other hand, it is not uncommon for fiduciary outs to be exercis-
able upon the occurrence of material developments that were not reasonably
foreseeable." Such an open-ended provision is, at least on its face, extremely
82 Id. ("Clearly, this language on its face cannot be construed as incorporating. ... either the right to
accept a better offer or the right to distribute proprietary information to third parties.").
83 AM. BAR Ass'N, MODEL MERGER AGREEMENT FOR THE ACQUISITION OF A PUBLIC COMPANY
(2011) [hereinafter MODEL MERGER AGREEMENT].
8 See id § 4.4.
85 See id. § 4.6.
86 See id §§ 4.4(a), 4.6(c)(i).
87 See id. § 4.6(c)(ii), at 171.
170 [VOL. 21:1
FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND FIDUCIARY OUTS
broad. The language of such provisions is highly reminiscent of material ad-
verse effect clauses."' Courts interpret material adverse effect clauses quite
restrictively in order to avoid easy exit from an acquisition agreement.89 No
doubt, material development fiduciary out provisions are intended to be read
similarly. However, whether this assumption will turn out as hoped is by no
means clear.
In any event, it would be wrong to suggest that fiduciary out provisions
have become standardized. There are plenty of issues on which negotiations
take place and fiduciary outs can vary. One obvious point is the definition of
a "superior offer" that is required to trigger the fiduciary out. The term can
be defined generally or specifically, and can be more or less demanding.9
Another point involves the conditions that supplement the superior offer re-
quirement, such as advice of legal counsel 91 and a right of first refusal on the
part of the other party to top a superior offer.92 Ultimately, every aspect of a
fiduciary out is negotiable. Because fiduciary outs are contractual, the possi-
bilities are endless.
B. Why Fiduciary Outs Exist
On the surface, the primary beneficiary of a fiduciary out would seem
to be the target directors. Such provisions ensure that compliance with fidu-
ciary duties would not result in a breach of contract. However, it is by no
means clear that compliance with fiduciary duties would ever constitute a
breach of contract. The courts insist that directors may not enter into contracts
that require them to breach their fiduciary duties: "To the extent that a con-
tract, or a provision thereof, purports to require a board to act or not act in
such a fashion as to limit the exercise of fiduciary duties, it is invalid and
unenforceable."93 Thus, it would seem that a fiduciary out is unnecessary and
does little to protect target directors.
If this assessment is correct, one might wonder why fiduciary outs exist
at all. The next obvious beneficiary would seem to be the acquirer. The ac-
quirer does not want the acquisition agreement to be invalidated. Even if the
88 See generally Ronald J. Gilson & Alan Schwartz, Understanding MACs: Moral Hazard in Ac-
quisitions, 21 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 330, 357-58 (2005); Robert T. Miller, The Economics of Deal Risk:
Allocating Risk Through MAC Clauses in Business Combination Agreements, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV.
2007, 2102 (2009).
89 Cf In re IBP, Inc. Shareholders Litig., 789 A.2d 14, 68 (Del. Ch. 2001) ("[A] buyer ought to have
to make a strong showing to invoke a Material Adverse Effect exception to its obligation to close.").
90 See MODEL MERGER AGREEMENT, supra note 83, § 4.4, at 156-61 (discussing possible objections
to the provision).
91 See id § 4.6(c)(i)(D)-(H), at 170-71.
92 See id., § 4.6(c)(i)(F), at 171.
93 CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 238 (Del. 2008) (quoting Paramount
Commc'ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 51 (Del. 1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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transaction itself is doomed because of the target directors' fiduciary duties,
the acquirer would prefer to keep the contract intact. There are many provi-
sions in an acquisition agreement which benefit the acquirer even if the de-
sired transaction does not take place. Two important examples are covenants
and termination fees. The former require the target to do, or not do, certain
things that benefit the acquirer.9 4 The latter act as liquidated damages provi-
sions, ensuring that the acquirer is compensated if the transaction is not con-
summated through no fault of its own." In order to secure these protections,
the acquirer needs to ensure that the contract is not invalidated. A fiduciary
out provision does this by severing the problematic obligations, which are
excused under certain circumstances, from the other obligations of the con-
tract, which remain enforceable. Since the target directors never have to
breach their fiduciary duties, the acquisition agreement remains valid and the
protective provisions remain enforceable. Thus, the acquirer may be the real
beneficiary of the fiduciary out.
This account has some merit, but it seems unlikely to be the driving
force behind fiduciary outs. Although certain provisions in acquisition agree-
ments may be legally problematic, it is not clear that such provisions would
lead to invalidation of the entire acquisition agreement. If a particular provi-
sion were to cause fiduciary duty issues, the courts could simply invalidate
that provision. 6 Of course, it is possible that the courts could invalidate the
entire agreement, or enough of it to cause serious problems for the acquirer.
Thus, there is a benefit to protecting against this risk. However, the risk is a
minor one, and the benefit of protecting against it is likely outweighed by the
cost of giving target directors an ability to escape key obligations. Acquirers
would prefer not to include fiduciary outs in acquisition agreements. They
want to lock up the transaction as quickly as possible and not give the target
any wiggle room. From their perspective, a fiduciary out is a necessary evil.
They accept it because they must. Thus, acquirers are not the motivating
force behind fiduciary outs.
Perhaps we must revisit the target directors. It is possible that they de-
mand fiduciary outs not because they feel that they need them, but because
they want them. However, this possibility is unlikely to explain the ubiquity
of fiduciary outs because target directors, as a class, are ambivalent toward
fiduciary outs. To the extent that such a provision provides directors with
protection from liability, then it is, of course, welcome. To the extent that it
resembles a discretionary option, it may also be welcome. It would allow
directors to secure the current deal while also pursuing a better deal. For di-
rectors who seek to maximize shareholder value, this is clearly beneficial.
94 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 419 (9th ed. 2009) (defining covenant).
95 See generally Gey Assocs. Gen. P'ship v. 310 Assocs., 346 F.3d 31, 33 (2d Cir. 2003) (per cu-
riam) (defining termination fee).
96 A contract is only invalid "to the extent" that it is problematic. This is not necessarily the same
thing as saying that a contract is invalid if any of its provisions arc problematic. See supra note 93 and
accompanying text.
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However, a fiduciary out can also be problematic for the target directors. To
the extent that the directors believe that they have found the best deal already,
a fiduciary out can be a curse. Directors may want to close the current deal
and resist offers from hostile third parties. However, a fiduciary out will en-
able directors to entertain and accept alternative offers. And, if directors can
do so, then it is quite possible that the courts will conclude that their fiduciary
duties require them to do so-even if the directors would prefer not to. This
would seem to be reason enough to exclude fiduciary outs from many
friendly acquisition agreements. Thus, it is unlikely that target directors are
the driving force. Fiduciary outs can be advantageous or disadvantageous,
depending upon the circumstances, so target directors would not demand
them in every case.
In fact, as a class, target directors probably are not ambivalent toward
fiduciary outs. The main benefit of the fiduciary out is that it can allow di-
rectors to entertain better offers. To the extent that this is the directors' goal,
however, they could shop the company before entering into an acquisition
agreement, or insist upon a "go shop" provision." On the other hand, to the
extent that directors want to close the current transaction, a fiduciary out can
get in the way. Thus, even target directors are more likely to accept fiduciary
outs than demand them.
If neither the target nor the acquirer is the motivating force behind fidu-
ciary outs, there is only one possibility left: the courts. The courts sit in judg-
ment over the directors when they are charged with a breach of fiduciary
duty. In most cases, judicial review is quite deferential because of the busi-
ness judgment rule." However, situations involving acquisitions are differ-
ent. Although independent directors cannot be said to be conflicted, at least
not in the sense of engaging in self-dealing,99 the courts have found them to
be structurally biased in such situations. 00 Thus, defensive actions are re-
viewed with enhanced scrutiny-a less deferential mode of review.o'0 In fact,
in appropriate situations, the courts will demand that directors seek the best
97 See generally Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 238 n.2 (Del. 2009) (defining "go
shop").
98 The business judgment rule is "a presumption that in making a business decision the directors of
a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was
in the best interests of the company." Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984), overruled on
other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000). In fact, it is "a powerful presumption."
Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993), modified, 636 A.2d 956 (Del. 1994); see
generally Velasco, supra note 66, at 828-34.
99 See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) ("[Tlhe business judg-
ment rule, including the standards by which director conduct is judged, is applicable here in the context
of a takeover." (quoting Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 627 (Del. 1984))).
100 See id at 954 (recognizing an "omnipresent specter that a board may be acting primarily in its
own interests, rather than those of the corporation and its shareholders").
101 See id. at 954-57.
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price reasonably available. 0 2 Consequently, the specter of liability for breach
of fiduciary duty looms-or at least the possibility of an injunction.0 3 If di-
rectors include fiduciary outs in acquisition agreements in order to avoid this
sort of judicial intervention, then the courts are the real motivating force.
The courts' concern is not misplaced. The real motive of the acquirer is
to close the transaction as quickly as possible. Thus, it will demand certain
contractual provisions-deal protection devices-that will "lock up" the
deal. Such provisions may include stock or asset lockups,'0 no shops,m5 and
termination fees, 06 to name just a few. Sometimes, the target directors may
agree to such demands only reluctantly-because the acquirer insists. Other
times, however, the target directors may be all too happy to accede-because
they, too, want to close the deal quickly. Of course, the target directors may
also refuse to include deal protection devices. Nevertheless, these provisions
make courts uncomfortable.
Courts find deal protection devices problematic for at least three rea-
sons. First, and most basically, such provisions do not obviously advance the
goal of obtaining the best price reasonably available for shareholders. Any
provision or device that would tend to make it more difficult for a superior
offer to prevail would be suspect in this regard.
Second, the courts cannot ascertain whether the target directors are act-
ing in the interests of shareholders or out of structural bias. The courts have
concluded that these provisions are not per se unreasonable:10 they could be
used to advance shareholder interests, or they could also be used to the share-
holders' detriment. os Of course, target directors could never be expected to
admit to misconduct. Thus, courts must remain skeptical.
A third reason that courts find deal protection devices troubling is that
they often interfere with shareholder rights. In many cases-most notably,
102 See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986) (stating
that when the breakup of the company became "inevitable," the "directors' role changed from defenders
of the corporate bastion to auctioneers charged with getting the best price for the stockholders at a sale of
the company"); see also Paramount Commc'ns, Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 48 (Del. 1993)
("[W]hen a corporation undertakes a transaction which will cause: (a) a change in corporate control; or
(b) a breakup of the corporate entity, the directors' obligation is to seek the best value reasonably available
to the stockholders." (emphasis omitted)).
103 An exculpation provision may eliminate the possibility of monetary damages, but not of equitable
relief. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2011); I DENNIS J. BLOCK ET AL., THE BUSINESS
JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS 227-28 (5th ed. 1998).
10 See generally THE DEALMAKER'S DICTIONARY OF MERGER AND ACQUISITION TERMINOLOGY
119 (Donnan Mandell ed., 1985) (defining lockups).
105 See generally BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1161 (9th ed. 2009) (defining no-shop provision).
106 See generally Gey Assocs. Gen. P'ship v. 310 Assocs., 346 F.3d 31, 33 (2d Cir. 2003) (per cu-
riam) (defining termination fee).
107 See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 183 ("A lock-up is not per se illegal under Delaware law.").
108 See id. ("[Wihile those lock-ups which draw bidders into the battle benefit shareholders, similar
measures which end an active auction and foreclose further bidding operate to the shareholders' detri-
ment.").
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mergers-directors must seek the approval of the shareholders before an ac-
quisition transaction can proceed.10" To the extent that shareholders have a
right to vote on a transaction, they should be free to vote as they wish. 0 It is
fair to assume that shareholders will vote in favor of a transaction if they
believe that it offers the best value reasonably available, and will vote against
it otherwise. However, deal protection devices may interfere with their vote,
making it difficult to vote as they would like. For example, a termination fee
may make it expensive for shareholders to vote no, even if they are opposed
to the agreement. A no shop provision may make it difficult for a third party
to make a better offer, thereby undermining shareholder confidence that the
current deal reflects the best value reasonably available. A lockup may make
it nearly impossible for a third party to make a superior offer, pressuring
shareholders to accept a deal with which they are uncomfortable. For direc-
tors to agree to provisions that interfere with shareholder voting rights is not
only unseemly but actually strikes at the very foundations of corporate law.'
For such reasons, courts are uncomfortable with deal protection devices.
They may be willing to strike down such provisions, or perhaps even the
entire agreement containing them. It is important to note, however, that the
focus of the courts' concern is not-or, at least, should not be-the acquirer's
behavior. As third parties in arm's-length negotiations, acquirers are ex-
pected to pursue their own selfish interests. They have no duty to the target
shareholders. Instead, the court's concern is focused on target directors. They
are the ones who might be acting inappropriately by entering into agreements
that interfere with shareholder rights. Thus, the courts use fiduciary duties as
a shield to protect the shareholders from misconduct on the part of the direc-
tors.
A fiduciary out is a compromise provision. Rather than leaving the fi-
duciary duty issue entirely up to the courts, the target and the acquirer agree
to decide the matter themselves, contractually. With a fiduciary out, the par-
ties can (try to) set boundaries that limit the discretion of the target directors
while also securing the enforceability of the remainder of the acquisition
agreement, if not the transaction itself. Thus, a fiduciary out is essentially a
contractual proxy for fiduciary duties. "2 Because they are derivative of fidu-
ciary duties, fiduciary outs also ultimately exist in order to protect sharehold-
ers from abuse at the hands of their directors.
109 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c) (2011) (dcfining merger); see also id. § 271(a) (defining
sale of substantially all assets).
I10 Cf Paramount Commc'ns, Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34,42 & n.1 I (Del. 1993) ("Be-
cause of the overriding importance of voting rights, [the courts] have consistently acted to protect stock-
holders from unwarranted interference with such rights.").
Il1 See MM Cos. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118, 1126 (Del. 2003) (citing Blasius Indus., Inc.
v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988)).
112 As a proxy, a fiduciary out not only stands in for, but also should serve the same purpose as,
fiduciary duties.
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Although they may have this effect, fiduciary outs-like fiduciary du-
ties--do not exist to protect shareholders from abuse at the hands of third
parties. That is the purpose of the fiduciary relation itself: shareholders are
unable to manage the business well on their own, so they hire expert manag-
ers. It is the managers' expertise that should protect shareholders from third
parties-not fiduciary duties or fiduciary outs."
In addition, fiduciary outs do not exist in order to ensure that sharehold-
ers get the best deals. Given the court's insistence that directors pursue this
goal, this might seem a difficult proposition to defend. However, the defense
is straightforward. As a general matter, corporate law does not mandate good
results; it mandates good faith effort on the part of fiduciaries."l4 Fiduciary
duties and fiduciary outs exist only to ensure that good faith effort. Moreover,
if the goal were to ensure that shareholders get the best deal reasonably avail-
able, there would be many superior options available to the courts. They
could, for example, require auctions or market tests before acquisitions; yet
they do not.' '5 Moreover, they only require that directors seek the best value
reasonably available when it has been determined that the company is for
sale."6 Before that point, directors may pursue long-term value according to
their best judgment."' Thus, the goal is not so much to seek the best value
reasonably available as it is to pursue the interests of the shareholders in good
faith according to their best judgment."8
Thus, fiduciary outs do not exist because either the target or the acquirer
demands them. Rather, the courts are the real motivating force. The courts
enforce the fiduciary duties of the target directors to pursue the interest of
shareholders and this can lead to the invalidation of acquisition agreements.
Rather than accept that risk, targets and acquirers agree to a contractual proxy
113 See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
114 See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000) ("Courts do not measure, weigh or quantify
directors' judgments. We do not even decide if they are reasonable in this context. Due care in the deci-
sionmaking context is process due care only. Irrationality is the outer limit of the business judgment rule
... [which] may tend to show that the decision is not made in good faith . . . ." (footnotes omitted)); In re
Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959,967 (Del.Ch. 1996) ("[W]hether a judge orjury con-
sidcring the matter after the fact, believes a decision substantively wrong, or degrees of wrong extending
through 'stupid' to 'egregious' or 'irrational', provides no ground for director liability, so long as the court
determines that the process employed was either rational or employed in a good faith effort to advance
corporate interests.").
115 Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286-87 (Del. 1989) ("[T]here is no single blue-
print that a board must follow to fulfill its duties. . . . When ... the directors possess a body of reliable
evidence with which to evaluate the fairness of a transaction, they may approve the transaction without
conducting an active survey of the market.").
116 See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
117 See Paramount Commc'ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1154 (Del. 1989) ("Directors are
not obliged to abandon a deliberately conceived corporate plan for a short-term shareholder profit unless
there is clearly no basis to sustain the corporate strategy.").
118 Of course, if directors are acting in good faith, they will seek the best value reasonably available
when it is appropriate to do so.
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for fiduciary duties in the form of fiduciary outs. Understanding this concept
is key to deciding how to interpret fiduciary outs provisions.
III. INTERPRETING FIDUCIARY OUTS
The previous Part explored what fiduciary outs are and why they exist.
This Part examines how fiduciary out provisions are, and should be, inter-
preted. Section A considers a general fiduciary out-one without conditions.
From the parties' perspective, the situation is problematic: such provisions
will not have the effect the drafters intended. Section B considers how more
narrowly tailored fiduciary outs are interpreted. Courts are not entirely com-
fortable with such provisions, and therefore the parties rely on them at their
own risk. Section C addresses how fiduciary out provisions should be inter-
preted. It argues that fiduciary outs should be interpreted consistently with
the purposes of fiduciary duties generally: to protect shareholders from abuse
at the hands of directors, rather than to protect shareholders from third parties
or bad circumstances.
A. General Outs
This Section considers the theoretical problems with interpreting fidu-
ciary outs by analyzing the heart of a typical provision. Based on language
from the ABA's Model Merger Agreement," 9 let us assume that a general
fiduciary out provides as follows:
[Notwithstanding any provision herein to the contrary,] this [Agreement] ... shall not prohibit
the Company from . . . [taking action inconsistent with its obligations hereunder] if . . . the
Company Board concludes in good faith ... that such action is required in order for the Com-
pany Board to comply with its fiduciary obligations to the Company's stockholders under ap-
plicable Legal Requirements ... .120
Such a provision would allow the target directors to decide whether their fi-
duciary duties allow them to comply with the provisions of the agreement.
It is clear that such language is not intended to create a discretionary
option on the part of the target board of directors. First, as discussed above,
the forces motivating the parties to enter into the transaction are inconsistent
with such an interpretation. 2 ' Second, the language itself does not grant an
option that can be exercised at the directors' discretion, preference, or whim.
Rather, directors are excused only if "such action is required" by their fidu-
ciary duties. Such language is not suggestive of optionality, but rather of
119 MODEL MERGER AGREEMENT, supra note 83, § 4.4, at 148-50.
120 Id.
121 See supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text.
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strict necessity. Third, the directors must make that determination in good
faith.
As a formal matter, if the fiduciary out is supposed to have limited ap-
plication, it might seem strange to leave the determination regarding its avail-
ability to the target directors, who would be tempted to use it opportunisti-
cally. One explanation might be found in the business judgment rule. Under
the business judgment rule, judicial review is very deferential and directors
are very rarely found liable for breach of fiduciary duty.'22 Thus, it would
seem obvious that the directors should rarely be required to avoid their obli-
gations under an acquisition agreement. Under such an interpretation, it
might not be so problematic to leave the determination in the hands of the
target directors: it should be difficult to argue that fiduciary duties require
any specific course of conduct.
Unfortunately, the law of fiduciary duties is more complicated. In par-
ticular, there is the divergence between standards of conduct and standards
of review which was introduced earlier.123 The drafters of fiduciary outs may
have the standards of review in mind. They may assume that, because direc-
tors generally will be found to have breached their fiduciary duties only upon
a finding of gross negligence, unfair self-dealing, or intentional misconduct,
they cannot be required to avoid their obligations pursuant to a fiduciary out
except under such circumstances. This would mean that the fiduciary out
would rarely be exercisable. Courts, however, focus on standards of conduct.
Courts demand that directors act with due care, utmost loyalty, and good
faith. Any failure to satisfy the standards amounts to a breach of fiduciary
duty-even if, because of the divergence in corporate law, they will not be
held liable for such breach.124 When determining whether a fiduciary out is
triggered, courts will consider what the standards of conduct require, rather
than what will lead to liability under the standards of review. This means that
the fiduciary out would be exercisable quite often. Thus, fiduciary outs will
be interpreted more expansively than the drafters intended.
In a previous work, I have addressed the divergence and its implica-
tions.125 I noted that many people are led to believe that fiduciary duty stand-
ards of conduct are merely aspirational, and that the "real law" is the corre-
sponding standard of review.126 This view leads to the awkward and untena-
ble conclusion that fiduciary duties only require directors to avoid gross neg-
ligence, unfair self-dealing, and intentional misconduct; and that they do not
require directors to avoid mere negligence, conflicts of interest, or lack of
122 See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
123 See supra notes 61-74 and accompanying text.
124 See Velasco, supra note 63, at 550-52.
125 Id. passim.
126 See id. at 522.
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good faith.127 In fact, the law is embodied in fiduciary duty standards of con-
duct.128 However, for prudential reasons, corporate law does not enforce
standards of conduct. It does this to avoid excessive risk aversion on the part
of directors, among other reasons. Nevertheless, standards of conduct are
mandatory. Directors are required to act with due care, utmost loyalty, and
good faith.129
Understanding this principle is necessary in order to understand the in-
terpretation of a fiduciary out. While the actors may think that they are pre-
serving the deference that comes from the standards of review, they are
wrong. When the courts interpret fiduciary out clauses, they have standard of
conduct in mind. What is necessary to avoid a breach of fiduciary duty is not
the same as what is necessary to avoid liability for breach of fiduciary duty.
Rather, to avoid a breach of fiduciary duty, directors must act with due care,
utmost loyalty, and good faith. In other words, directors must use their busi-
ness judgment to act in the interests of the shareholders.
This requirement has significant ramifications for the interpretation of
fiduciary outs. In interpreting such provisions, courts do not focus on the bare
minimum that is required of directors, as they do when they weigh whether
to hold directors liable for damages.' Instead, they insist that directors make
their own determinations about what the situation requires.' Fiduciary du-
ties require directors always to act in the interests of the shareholders. There-
fore, if they are able to escape an obligation that is not in the shareholders'
interests, they must do so. Failure to exercise the fiduciary out would itself
be a breach of fiduciary duty-even if the breach would not lead to liabil-
ity.132 Thus, their rights under the fiduciary out provision are automatically
triggered. Although fiduciary outs are not technically a discretionary option,
they are functionally indistinguishable from the acquirer's perspective. The
target company can avoid the acquisition agreement if it becomes in the
shareholders' interest to do so.
In fact, the implications go further. If directors have the right to avoid a
transaction, then they likely have a duty to do so. Because personal liability
is not an issue when injunctive relief is sought by the shareholders, the courts
127 See id. at 524.
128 Eisenberg, supra note 61, at 467-68.
129 See Vclasco, supra note 63, at 568-71.
130 See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 255-56 (Del. 2000).
131 See, e.g., ACE Ltd. v. Capital Re Corp., 747 A.2d 95, 106 (Del. Ch. 1999).
132 See Velasco, supra note 63, at 554 ("Under the mandatory view, a failure to comply with the
standard of conduct also could be considered a breach of fiduciary duty. Unless there is also a failure to
comply with the standard of review, however, the plaintiffs cannot establish a breach that would invoke
judicial intervention."); see also id. at 552 ("If directors or officers who violate the standards of reasona-
bleness and fairness sometimes escape liability because of a less demanding standard of review, it is not
because they have acted properly, but because utilizing standards of review that were fully congruent with
the relevant standards of conduct would impose greater costs than the costs of letting some persons who
violated their standards of conduct escape liability." (quoting Eisenberg, supra note 61, at 467-68)).
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may be less deferential and willing to require the directors to exercise the
fiduciary out. 33
Sometimes court interference actually can be expected. For example,
under the Revlon doctrine, if the corporation is "for sale," then it is explicitly
the duty of the directors to obtain the best value reasonably available.134 Un-
der such circumstances, it would be difficult for the target directors to justify
standing by the original transaction whenever an objectively superior offer
comes along. In such case, it can no longer be considered a discretionary
option, but rather a mandatory one. And, although true Revlon situations are
not as common as might be expected,'3 similar concerns animate judicial
review with respect to any acquisition agreements.
This result is arguably unfair because it is so divergent from the intent
of the drafters. The target directors have little ground to complain: although
they may have hoped that the provision would be interpreted otherwise, they
are bound to act in the interests the shareholders and have no basis to com-
plain when the courts require them to do so. However, the acquirer is in a
different situation. The acquirer owes no fiduciary duties to the target share-
holders. The acquirer has the right to contract in its own interests and can
develop expectation interests in those contracts. Thus, it seems unfair to force
the acquirer to bear the burden of protecting target shareholders from their
own directors. Nevertheless, this Article argues that the situation is not as
unfair as it may seem.
B. Specific Outs
If a general fiduciary out would be interpreted as broadly as this Article
claims, then it might be preferable for the acquirer to risk entering into an
agreement without a fiduciary out. 13 6 A general fiduciary out would seem to
do nothing to limit the discretion of directors. As long as the acquirer is con-
fident that the entire acquisition agreement would not be struck down in its
absence, a general fiduciary out provides the acquirer with no benefit.
" Cf 2 JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, COX & HAZEN ON CORPORATIONS § 10.08, at 512-
13 (2d ed. 2003) ("A charter provision shielding directors from liability for breaches of care may well
encourage the courts to scrutinize directors' decisions more closely without fear that substituting the
court's judgment for that of the directors will also visit a draconian remedy on an individual director.").
134 See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 184 (Del. 1986).
135 "Revlon duties do not arise simply because a company is 'in play.' The duty to seek the best
available price applies only when a company embarks on a transaction-on its own initiative or in re-
sponse to an unsolicited offer-that will result in a change of control." Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970
A.2d 235, 242 (Del. 2009) (footnote omitted); see also Paramount Commn'cs, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc.,
637 A.2d 34, 47 (Del. 1993) (discussing "two circumstances which may implicate Revlon duties"). In
addition, an exculpation provision in a corporation's charter may limit the court's analysis to duty of
loyalty issues. See Lyondell, 970 A.2d at 239.
136 Of course, the target directors may insist upon its inclusion.
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In order to avoid the breadth of a general fiduciary out, the parties to
acquisition agreements draft more narrowly tailored provisions. One im-
portant method is to add conditions to the exercisability of the fiduciary out.
The main goal of such conditions, and other limits, is to constrain the discre-
tion of the target directors so that the acquisition agreement is not simply an
option contract. Directors should be able to escape their obligations under the
acquisition agreement only if legally necessary. They should not be able to
do so simply because they have changed their opinions on the advisability of
the transaction.
One common condition to the exercise of a fiduciary out is that the tar-
get directors seek the advice of external counsel.'37 A strong version of this
condition would require the directors to obtain a written opinion of counsel
stating that a given course of action is necessary to avoid a breach of fiduciary
duty.' 8 The goal behind such a requirement is not entirely unreasonable. In
order to ensure that the exercise of a fiduciary out is actually necessary, and
not simply desired by the target directors, the acquirer requires support in the
form of a written opinion of counsel. A lawyer could not simply rely on his
gut feelings but would have to provide reasoned argument and put his repu-
tation on the line. Of course, the acquirer's unstated hope is that the attorney
will be unable to conclude that any specific course of action is required by
fiduciary duties, and the fiduciary out would not be exercisable.
Unfortunately for acquirers, the Delaware Chancery Court has had
problems with such conditions. In ACE Ltd. v. CapitalRe Corp.,139 then-Vice
Chancellor Strine suggested that that a requirement that the directors obtain
a written opinion of counsel before they invoke the fiduciary out would be
unacceptable. " According to the court, "[such a] provision is ... pernicious
in that it involves an abdication by the board of its duty to determine what its
own fiduciary obligations require at precisely that time in the life of the com-
pany when the board's own judgment is most important." 4 1 In other words,
directors not only must comply with their fiduciary duties, they also must
exercise their own independent business judgment in doing so. This jealous
guarding of the directors' fiduciary duties is a consistent theme in Delaware:
as fiduciaries, the directors must manage the corporation for the benefit of
the shareholders and cannot delegate this responsibility to others-not even
137 See, e.g., MODEL MERGER AGREEMENT, supra note 83, §§ 4.4(a)(2), 4.6(c)(i)(D).
138 See I ARTHUR FLEISCHER, JR. & ALEXANDER R. SUSSMAN, TAKEOVER DEFENSE: MERGERS AND
ACQUISITIONS § 14.05[A][3][a], at 14-128 to -130 (Supp. 2012).
139 747 A.2d 95 (Del. Ch. 1999).
140 Id. at 106 ("If § 6.3 of the Merger Agreement in fact required the Capital Re board to eschew
even discussing another offer unless it received an opinion of counsel stating that such discussions were
required, and if ACE demanded such a provision, it is likely that § 6.3 will ultimately be found invalid.").
141 id
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to the shareholders themselves.142 As a result, the ability of the acquirer to
constrain the discretion of the target directors is limited.
A more moderate version of this condition might require only that the
board "take[] into account the advice of its outside legal counsel" in making
its good faith determination.143 In light of the ACE Ltd. opinion, this type of
condition has become far more common than the stricter alternative.144 There
is no inappropriate delegation of the director's fiduciary duties because di-
rectors retain the right to make the ultimate decision. Thus, the condition is
likely valid. Of course, as a result, it is also not nearly as effective from the
acquirer's position. There is a hope that the directors will act more soberly if
they must consult with others than they might if they were to act on their
own. However, whether this condition has any meaningful effect is unclear.
After all, directors in this situation are almost certainly seeking advice from
outside legal counsel regardless of any contractual requirement to do so.
Another common provision allows the fiduciary out to be invoked only
if a superior offer is in play.145 In principle, this is reasonable: it limits the
operation of the fiduciary out to those situations that are the most important
as a substantive matter and that seem to concern the courts the most. It would
prevent the target directors from simply changing their minds on the merits
of the transaction and using fiduciary duties as an excuse to avoid the con-
tract.
However, there may be problems with this type of fiduciary out as well.
The acquisition agreement defines what will constitute a superior offer. Any
offer that does not meet the specific requirements will not provide a basis for
invoking the fiduciary out. It is possible for the acquirer to make a superior
offer that does not meet the contractual definition of a "superior offer." Fi-
duciary duties could require the directors to consider the offer. If so, any pro-
vision that does not permit them to do so will likely be invalidated by the
courts.146 Of course, if the definition of superior offer is broad enough, there
may be no such problem. However, a broad definition also does less to limit
the discretion of directors than a narrower definition would. Thus, the ac-
quirer must balance its desire to cabin the discretion of the target directors
against the possibility that the courts will find their efforts to be excessive.
142 Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1214 (Del. 1996) ("Directors may not delegate duties which
lic 'at the heart of the management of the corporation."' (quoting Chapin v. Benwood Found., Inc., 402
A.2d 1205, 1210 (Del. Ch. 1979))); Paramount Commc'ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1154 (Del.
1989) ("The fiduciary duty to manage a corporate enterprise ... may not be delegated to the stockhold-
ers.").
143 MODEL MERGER AGREEMENT, supra note 83, § 4.4(a)(2), at 149.
144 See FLEISCHER & SUSSMAN, supra note 138, § 14.05[A][3][a), at 14-128 to -130.
145 See, e.g., MODEL MERGER AGREEMENT, supra note 83, § 4.4(a), at 148-49 (referring to disclo-
sures and discussions "in response to an Acquisition Proposal that is, or is reasonably likely to result in, a
Superior Proposal"); see also id. § 4.6(c)(i)(A), at 170 (referencing "an unsolicited, bona fide, written
offer to cffect a transaction of the type referred to in the definition of the term Superior Proposal").
146 See supra notes 93 and accompanying text.
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One other provision can help put fiduciary outs in perspective. Acquisi-
tion agreements often have a "force the vote" provision that requires the di-
rectors to submit the agreement for a shareholder vote even if they should
change their minds as to the advisability of the transaction. Such a provision
is legal under Delaware law.147 However, sometimes the agreement goes fur-
ther and requires the target board of directors to recommend the transaction
to the shareholders.148 This requirement is much more problematic.
In order to comply with their duty of good faith, directors must be hon-
est with shareholders.149 If they no longer believe that a transaction is in the
interest of the shareholders, they cannot lie to the shareholders by suggesting
otherwise.5 0 In addition to violating their fiduciary duties, such a lie would
also violate the federal securities laws.' 5' Any such contractual obligation is
certain to be invalidated.'52 A broad fiduciary out could save the agreement,
because it would allow the directors to speak the truth. However, a narrow
fiduciary out that would only allow the directors to speak the truth under
certain circumstances would not be helpful. If at any point the directors are
not free to speak truthfully to the shareholders, there will be a fiduciary duty
problem and the agreement risks invalidation.
It seems difficult to escape the conclusion that such conditions on the
exercise of a fiduciary out are of limited legal value. As the law stands, an
acquisition agreement cannot require directors to breach their fiduciary du-
ties.' Any time a condition limits the ability of directors to invoke a fiduci-
ary out, it risks being invalidated by the courts. To be sure, a reasonable con-
dition is less likely to run into problems than a more demanding condition.
But this is only because it does less. The fact remains that any restrictions on
147 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 146 (2011).
148 FLEISCHER & SUSSMAN, supra note 138, § 14.05[A][31[b], at 14-136 ("Merger agreements com-
monly contain covenants requiring the target board of directors (and in a transaction requiring a vote of
the shareholders of the acquiror, the board of the acquiror) to recommend that stockholders approve a
transaction.").
149 See Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 10 (Del. 1998) ("[Wlhen directors communicate publicly or
directly with shareholders about corporate matters, the sine qua non of directors' fiduciary duty to share-
holders is honesty.").
150 See FLEISCHER & SUSSMAN, supra note 138, § 14.05[A], at 14-132 to -133 ("[A] merger agree-
ment cannot limit the exercise of a board's fiduciary duties to review the transaction and make a recom-
mendation that is consistent with these duties." (citing Frontier Oil Corp. v. Holly Corp., No. 20502, 2005
Del. Ch. LEXIS 57, at *102 (Del. Ch. Apr. 29, 2005))); see also id. at 14-133 n.370.
151 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (2012) (prohibiting use of false or misleading statements in connection
with proxy solicitation).
152 See FLEISCHER & SUSSMAN, supra note 138, § 14.05[A][3][b], at 14-136 to -137 ("Any contrac-
tual obligation to recommend a transaction that does not allow a board to withdraw its recommendation
if the board no longer believes the transaction is in the best interests of its stockholders may well be
invalid."); Allen, supra note 1, at 658 ("Obviously, recommendation of a transaction that one in fact no
longer believes is in the shareholders' best interest is deeply problematic. Thus, any provision that com-
mits the board to recommend the deal at a future time must be accompanied by a fiduciary out clause.").
153 See FLEISCHER & SUSSMAN, supra note 138, § 14.05[A], at 14-132 to -133.
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a fiduciary out are likely to be held invalid exactly when they are most valu-
able to the acquirer. If so, such provisions are of limited legal significance:
they provide only the illusion of protection to acquirers. When push comes
to shove, they are no better than a general fiduciary out.
That said, it is not necessarily the case that reasonable conditions on the
exercise of a fiduciary out are entirely worthless. For example, if target di-
rectors believe them to be valid, the belief may lead them to conclude that
compliance with the agreement would not lead to a breach of fiduciary duty.
Moreover, it is possible that following procedures specified in the agreement
could lead directors to conclude, in good faith, that they can stick with the
original deal. It is also quite possible, at least in a marginal case, that a court
could come to a different conclusion in the presence of a reasonable condition
than it would in its absence. Thus, even if a provision has no legal value as a
theoretical matter, it can be quite valuable as a practical matter.
It is also worth noting that some types of conditions are less likely to be
problematic. Conditions that prevent the exercise of a fiduciary out are more
likely to cause problems than those that require additional behavior upon its
exercise. For example, it is common for acquisition agreements to provide
that the target directors can exercise a fiduciary out and negotiate with a third
party only if they keep the acquirer fully informed regarding such negotia-
tions and grant to the acquirer a right of first refusal over the third party's
final offer.15 4 There is nothing inherently problematic about requirements
such as these. Although fiduciary duties might require exploration in the face
of a superior offer, they are unlikely to forbid the sharing of information or
dictate which of two identical offers must be accepted. Thus, this type of
condition can provide a clear benefit to the acquirer.
Of course, such provisions would not be entirely safe from legal chal-
lenge. Any provision could be structured in such an onerous way as to render
it legally problematic. Nevertheless, there is a significant difference between
the two types of conditions. This second type operates ex post rather than ex
ante and is less of a condition on the exercise of a fiduciary out and more of
a new covenant imposed upon the exercise of a fiduciary out. It may be better
analyzed as a deal protection device (that itself might need to be subject to a
fiduciary out) than as part of the fiduciary out. However, the difference is not
especially important because, either way, the provision is likely to be invalid
if it would require the target directors to breach their fiduciary duties.
In short, ex ante conditions on the exercise of a fiduciary out are of lim-
ited legal value. To the extent they would require directors to breach their
fiduciary duties, such provisions are likely to be invalidated. To the extent
they are worded to avoid such outcome, they are doing little work and begin
to resemble a general fiduciary out. And although the invalidation of a con-
dition to the exercise of a fiduciary out may seem unlikely, it is precisely
154 See MODEL MERGER AGREEMENT, supra note 83, §§ 4.4(a)(3)-(4), 4.4(b) (discussing the sharing
of information); id. § 4.6(c)(i)(E)-(F) (discussing the right of first refusal).
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when the protection of such provisions is most needed that they are most
likely to cause problems.
C. How Fiduciary Outs Should Be Interpreted
How should a fiduciary out be interpreted? It should be interpreted con-
sistent with its purpose. As previously discussed, fiduciary outs are contrac-
tual proxies for fiduciary duties.15 Thus, fiduciary outs should be interpreted
consistently with fiduciary duties.
The purpose of fiduciary duties is to protect shareholders from abuse at
the hands of directors. As previously discussed, they are not about protecting
shareholders from bad deals, nor are they about protecting shareholders from
third parties.'56 It is the directors who are supposed to protect shareholders
from bad deals and third parties, and when they fail to do so, the court may
have to intervene. But, fundamentally, the sole purpose of fiduciary duties,
and derivatively of fiduciary outs, is to protect shareholders from directors.
It is problematic, then, that one of the main effects of a fiduciary out is
to protect shareholders from bad deals with third parties-the acquirers.
Since the acquirer owes no fiduciary duties to target shareholders, it is not at
all clear that they should be the ones to bear the burden of protecting share-
holders from directors. If fiduciary outs are to withstand scrutiny, they re-
quire further justification.
To develop a justification, let us first consider a typical contract. As-
sume that the target is the purchaser under a sales contract, and the contract
provides that the target directors may escape their obligations under the con-
tract if necessary in order to avoid a breach of fiduciary duty. In such a case,
it is difficult to imagine that the fiduciary out could ever be triggered because
it is simply not a breach to comply with a legitimate contract. Although cir-
cumstances may change (e.g., market prices may fall or rise) such that it
would be nice for the shareholders to get out of the contract, the corporation
would still be bound by it. At least, I am unaware of any case to the contrary.
A contrary rule would seriously undermine commercial law, for it would be
implicated in very many cases.
The only way that a court could come to a different result would be if it
interpreted the fiduciary out as itself creating an option on the part of a cor-
poration.'57 If the corporation had an option to avoid the contract, then the
155 See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
156 See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
157 A second theoretical possibility would be if the directors had a fiduciary duty to breach a contract
in situations amounting to an efficient breach. In that case, the fiduciary out clause could have the effect
of eliminating the need to pay damages for the efficient breach-because once the directors have a fidu-
ciary duty to avoid the transaction, they also have a contractual right to do so. However, the courts have
not held that directors have a fiduciary duty to commit efficient breaches of contract.
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directors arguably would have a fiduciary duty to exercise that right in ap-
propriate circumstances. However, it is clearly not the intention of the parties
to a fiduciary out provision to create an option contract.158
Ultimately, the possibility of accidentally creating an option is a mere
distraction that can be eliminated by simple drafting. A fiduciary out provi-
sion can provide that it shall not be deemed to create any sort of option and
that it is triggered only by a breach of a fiduciary duty that would exist in the
absence of the fiduciary out.'5 9 In this case, and likely even without such a
proviso, there would be no breach of fiduciary duty in complying with the
contract, and thus no right to invoke the fiduciary out. From here on, this
Article assumes that fiduciary outs are either so drafted or interpreted as if
they were.
The limited effect of a fiduciary out in a typical contract flows logically
from the nature of fiduciary duties. Their sole purpose is to protect benefi-
ciaries from fiduciaries. A fiduciary cannot be required to do any more than
his best. To the extent that a fiduciary has discretion, it is possible for him to
abuse that discretion. To the extent that a fiduciary does not have discretion,
however, it is impossible for him to breach his fiduciary duties. 160 If circum-
stances have changed, it might be desirable for the directors to be able to
avoid a contract or lease-but they have no right to do so. Thus, there is no
breach of fiduciary duty.
The same logic could be applied to an acquisition agreement. The mere
fact that it would be in the best interest of the shareholders to avoid the agree-
ment should not give the target directors the right to do so. In other words, it
should not be a breach of fiduciary duty to comply with an acquisition agree-
ment solely because it would be in the best interests of the shareholders not
to do so. Thus, fiduciary outs are inherently problematic. If they are contrac-
tual proxies for fiduciary duties, they should be interpreted consistently
therewith. Fiduciary duties do not allow directors to avoid ordinary contracts
simply because they are no longer in the shareholders' interests. If the typical
fiduciary out is to be justifiable, then it must be distinguished from other
contracts in a meaningful way. Fortunately, as we will see in the next Part,
there is such a distinguishing rationale.
IV. THE M&A CONTEXT
As discussed in the previous Section, a fiduciary out is inherently prob-
lematic. It allows one party to get out of the agreement while binding the
other party to remain, making the acquisition agreement, in a very real sense,
158 See supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text.
159 For the sake of argument, we could assume that the fiduciary out also provides that it shall not
have any application with respect to an efficient breach.
160 But see CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 238-39 (Del. 2008).
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an option on the part of the target company. From the perspective of the ac-
quirer, this seems unfair.
Nevertheless, it is defensible. This Part explores the justification for fi-
duciary outs. Section A considers the arguments in favor of fiduciary outs in
merger agreements. Section B explores the limits of those arguments using
the Omnicare case as an example.'"' It concludes that, although the Omnicare
case is highly controversial, it may have been correctly decided given the
special context of a merger agreement.
A. Mergers and Fiduciary Outs
1. Justification
There is a longstanding principle of equity that fiduciaries cannot enter
into contracts that would require them to breach their fiduciary duties. As the
Delaware Supreme Court has put it, "[t]o the extent that a contract, or a pro-
vision thereof, purports to require a board to act or not act in such a fashion
as to limit the exercise of its fiduciary duties, it is invalid and unenforcea-
ble." 62 This is the rule that courts rely upon to strike down deal protection
devices and, derivatively, the rule that underlies the use of fiduciary outs.
Therefore, it is important to understand what the rule does and does not mean.
Applying this rule is not a simple proposition because an overly broad inter-
pretation could undermine nearly all business contracts.
How far should this principle extend? Certainly, directors should not be
permitted to enter into contracts with the purpose of breaching fiduciary du-
ties. This is a safe interpretation because most contracts cannot be character-
ized in this way. Beyond this point, things get complicated. Surely it would
be problematic to forbid contracts that might require conduct that, if freely
undertaken in the absence of contractual obligation, would be considered a
breach of the fiduciary duty. For example, paying a higher-than-market price
is problematic if freely undertaken on an open market, but fine if done pur-
suant to a pre-existing, long-term contract. Because almost any contract
could cause problems under such an interpretation, it goes too far. The ap-
propriate limits lie somewhere between these points.
Given the nature of fiduciary duties, which exist to protect shareholders
from abuse at the hands of directors and not to ensure good results,'16 the
appropriate interpretation should not be based upon the merits of the transac-
tion or the consequences that result. Thus, it should not be a breach of fidu-
ciary duty to comply with a contract that turns out to be suboptimal. If every
161 Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003).
162 Paramount Commn'cs Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 51 (Del. 1993) (citing Wilming-
ton Trust v. Coulter, 200 A.2d 441, 452-54); see also CA, 953 A.2d at 238-40 (noting cases that invalidated
contracts limiting directors' exercise of fiduciary duties).
163 See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
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contract that turns out to be suboptimal for the corporation were to be subject
to a fiduciary out or otherwise unenforceable, contracting would become im-
possible. With perfect hindsight, a better course of action was almost always
available. Similarly, it should not be a breach of fiduciary duty to enter into
a contract that forecloses the possibility of a better deal in the future. Again,
very many contracts do that.'1"
Consistent with the nature of fiduciary duties, the appropriate interpre-
tation for the rule must be based on the directors' conduct-including their
future conduct. Thus, directors should not be able to enter into contracts that
could be expected to lead to a breach of fiduciary duty. It is clearly problem-
atic for directors to enter into contracts that they know will actually require
them to breach their fiduciary duties. However, from the perspective of eq-
uity, it is equally problematic for directors to enter into contracts that may
require them to breach their fiduciary duties. For example, directors have a
duty of candor to speak truthfully to the shareholders.' Although they do
not always have an affirmative duty to speak, they cannot lie when they do.'6
Thus, directors should not be permitted to enter into an agreement that could
ever require them to lie to their shareholders. Doing so should amount to an
agreement to breach their fiduciary duties, and complying with such an
agreement certainly would. This behavior is precisely what the rule should
seek to prohibit.
Although it may not be a breach of fiduciary duty for directors to com-
ply with a valid obligation, a breach may be found in entering into the agree-
ment in the first place. Directors should not be able to prevent themselves
from complying with their fiduciary duties in the future, so it should be a
breach of their fiduciary duties for directors to enter into a contract that pre-
sents a sufficient risk of doing so. Moreover, if it is a breach to enter into the
agreement, then the contract is not a valid obligation, and attempting to com-
ply with it in may also be a breach. 161
1 See Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1214-15 (Del. 1996) ("[Bjusiness decisions are not an
abdication of directorial authority mercly because they limit a board's freedom of future action. A board
which has decided to manufacture bricks has less freedom to decide to make bottles. In a world of scarcity,
a decision to do one thing will commit a board to a certain course of action and make it costly and difficult
(indeed, sometimes impossible) to change course and do another. This is an inevitable fact of life and is
not an abdication of directorial duty."), overruled on other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244,
255 (Del. 2000); Jewel Cos. v. Pay Less Drug Stores Nw., Inc., 741 F.2d 1555, 1564 (9th Cir. 1984)
("[A]ll contracts are formed at a single point in time and are based on the information available at that
moment. The pursuit of competitive advantage has never been recognized at law as a sufficient reason to
render void, or voidable, an otherwise valid contract.").
165 See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
166 See Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 710-11 (Del. 2009); Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 726 A.2d
1215, 1223 (Del. 1999).
167 Whether there is a second breach depends upon whether, at the time in question, the actions taken
in compliance with the agreement amount to a breach.
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With this interpretation in mind, we can now proceed to distinguish ac-
quisition agreements from most other contracts. Perhaps the most significant
difference between the two classes of contracts is the role of the shareholders.
Under corporate law, directors manage the business.I" Shareholders have no
say in ordinary business decisions. However, for certain fundamental trans-
actions, shareholders do have a say. For example, in order for a merger agree-
ment to become effective, it must be approved by the directors and the share-
holders of both corporations.' 69 The same is true for a sale of substantially all
of a corporation's assets.170 Although a tender offer does not require a share-
holder vote at the corporate level, it does require the voluntary act of share-
holders tendering their shares, which is similar to a vote in many respects.
Although shareholders do not get to vote on most contracts, they do have the
right to vote-or at least a say--on most acquisition agreements."'
The courts have recognized that "the stockholder franchise has been
characterized as 'ideological underpinning' upon which the legitimacy of the
directors [sic] managerial power rests." 72 "Because of the overriding im-
portance of voting rights, [the courts] have consistently acted to protect
stockholders from unwarranted interference with such rights."' 73 Thus, direc-
tors have a duty to respect the shareholder right to vote. In their zeal for a
particular transaction, directors may not be as respectful as they should be. If
so, judicial intervention may be necessary.
As a general matter, the courts have indicated a willingness to enjoin
director action if shareholders can prove that directors acted for the primary
purpose of thwarting a shareholder vote. 7 4 This is a high bar, and it is a dif-
ficult test for shareholders to pass.'7" However, it must be understood in con-
text. This test is a standard of review rather than the standard of conduct. The
standard of conduct may be that directors should not purposefully interfere
with shareholder voting. Because of the presumption of the business judg-
168 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2011).
169 Id. § 251(c).
170 See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
171 However, shareholders do not have a say on all acquisitions. For example, the acquirer's share-
holders do not necessarily have a vote on an asset purchase. See, e.g., Paramount Commc'ns, Inc. v. Time
Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1148 (Del. 1989) (merger was restructured into asset purchase to avoid shareholder
vote). Similarly, in a triangular merger, a vote of the shareholders can be avoided for one of the two
corporations (usually, but not necessarily, the acquirer). See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1079 (9th ed.
2009) (defining triangular merger).
172 MM Cos. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118, 1126 (Del. 2003) (quoting Blasius Indus., Inc.
v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988)).
173 Paramount Commc'ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 42 & n. I1 (Del. 1993) (citing
cases).
174 Blasius Indus., 564 A.2d at 661-62.
175 See MMCos., 813 A.2d at 1130; Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1376 (Del. 1996).
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ment rule, the duty may not be enforced very strictly in many circum-
stances."' However, in the context of a business combination, less deference
may be appropriate."' In any event, my purpose here is not to propose recon-
sideration of the Blasius standard, but rather to provide a justification for fi-
duciary outs in acquisition agreements.
It would be inconsistent with their fiduciary duties for directors to inter-
fere with a shareholder vote. Thus, for directors to enter into an agreement
with deal protection devices that they know could interfere with a shareholder
vote would implicate their fiduciary duties."' Why would directors agree to
provisions that might impinge upon the shareholder vote? There might be
many reasons. At the most basic level, they might honestly believe that this
is the best transaction for the shareholders. However, they might too easily
believe that the transaction that is preferred by them or by the officers is ob-
jectively superior. Another reason, inconsistent with their duty of loyalty, is
that they might have negotiated a deal that is best for them, as opposed to for
the shareholders. Whatever the reason, it is inappropriate for the directors to
restrict the legal right of the shareholders to vote against the transaction if
they desire.' 79 A fiduciary out can help to ensure that no contractual provision
ends up having this effect.
Whether deal protection devices would lead to a finding of a breach of
fiduciary duties in any particular case-under the Blasius principle or other-
wise'"8 -may not be entirely clear for the reasons discussed above. However,
the existence of the fiduciary out changes the calculus in the shareholders'
favor. The directors are permitted-and therefore required-to avoid an ob-
ligation if it would lead to a breach of fiduciary duty. Even conduct that might
not lead to a judicial finding of a breach of fiduciary duty (under the defer-
ential standard of review) could still amount to a breach of fiduciary duty
(under the more demanding standard of conduct).'"' Interfering with the
shareholder vote is a perfect example. If a deal protection device interferes
with the shareholder right to vote, it amounts to a breach of fiduciary duty
under the standard of conduct which can serve as the basis for an exercise of
the fiduciary out. Thus, protecting the shareholder right to vote could form
the basis for an exercise of the fiduciary out.
176 See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993) modified, 636 A.2d 956
(Del. 1994).
177 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
178 See supra note 11I and accompanying text.
179 See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
180 See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 185 (Del. 1986);
Unocal Corp. v. Mcsa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 959 (Del. 1985).
181 See Velasco, supra note 63, at 550-51.
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This principle is one of the key purposes of the fiduciary out: to protect
the shareholder right to vote on the underlying transaction. 8 2 Although fidu-
ciary outs are inherently problematic, they are justified in the limited context
of acquisitions because they protect the shareholder right to vote against the
agreement, which is a concern that is not present with respect to other con-
tracts.' Importantly, this justification is consistent with the purposes of fi-
duciary duties generally. Fiduciary outs, like fiduciary duties, exist to protect
shareholders from directors. The ability of the corporation to avoid certain
obligations under an acquisition agreement-and the corresponding obliga-
tion of the directors to do so-is necessary to protect the shareholder right to
vote against the transaction from interference by the directors.
Any effect on the acquirer is entirely incidental. Although this conclu-
sion may not be very comforting to the acquirer, there are two important rea-
sons why their complaints do not carry much weight. The first is that there is
not yet a binding agreement. While a sales contract or lease becomes a valid
and binding obligation the moment it is executed by the officers or directors
of the corporation, acquisition agreements generally do not. Shareholder ap-
proval is often required.18 4 Thus, until such approval is obtained, the ac-
quirer's expectation interest is attenuated.
The second reason that acquirers are less sympathetic is that they do not
exactly have clean hands. The acquirer negotiated the agreement with the
target directors. It likely demanded the deal protection devices in order to
lock up the transaction against any risks-including shareholder rejection. It
did so in full knowledge of the fact that the shareholders have a legal right to
vote on the transaction and that the target directors have a fiduciary duty to
protect this right. Thus, the acquirer may be considered complicit in any
breach of fiduciary duty by the target directors.I" Although the acquirer itself
does not have any fiduciary duty toward the target shareholders, neither does
it have the right to circumvent the legal requirements for the transaction it
desires.
Although the concept of a fiduciary out is generally problematic, it is
not nearly as problematic in the context of an acquisition agreement. The
182 Cf ACE Ltd. v. Capital Re Corp., 747 A.2d 95, 109 (Del. Ch. 1999) ("[F]iduciary responsibilities
are of special importance in situations where a board is entering into a transaction as significant as a
merger affecting stockholder ownership rights. For that (sometimes unspoken) reason, our law has subor-
dinated the contract rights of third party suitors to stockholders' interests in not being improperly subjected
to a fundamental corporate transaction as a result of a fiduciary breach by their board.").
183 See supra note 109 and accompanying text. Most corporate contracts do not require shareholder
approval. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2011).
184 See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
185 Cf Paramount Commc'ns Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34,51 (Del. 1993) ("Viacom, a
sophisticated party with experienced legal and financial advisors, knew of (and in fact demanded) the
unreasonable features of the . . . Agreement. It cannot be now heard to argue that it obtained vested con-
tract rights by negotiating and obtaining contractual provisions from a board acting in violation of its
fiduciary duties.").
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acquirer has both a diminished expectation interest and increased culpability.
Moreover, the effect on them is incidental rather than intended. The real pur-
pose is, as it should be, to protect the shareholders from directors.
2. Professor Regan's Factors
In an insightful article written over a decade ago, Professor Paul Regan
addressed the issue of how courts should deal with preclusive lockups in ac-
quisition agreements.'I" He stressed the need to balance the interests of share-
holders in the fiduciary relationship with directors, on the one hand, against
the expectation interests of the acquirer in the underlying contract.'8I He de-
veloped a four-factor test to aid the courts in doing so.'s5 This test has caught
the Delaware Court of Chancery's attention and was employed by Chancellor
Strine (then vice chancellor) in an important opinion.' Regan's analysis
therefore deserves attention. Because fiduciary outs are simply a contractual
proxy for fiduciary duties, it is quite possible that Regan's test could be help-
ful in interpreting fiduciary out provisions.
Regan summarized his four-factor test as follows:
In determining whether a corporate acquirer has protectable contractual interests under a mer-
ger or other agreement with a target corporation whose directors have breached their fiduciary
duties in approving the change of control transaction, a court should consider the following:
(1) whether the acquiror knew, or should have known, of the target board's breach of fiduciary
duty; (2) whether the change of control transaction remains pending or is already consummated
at the time that judicial intervention is sought; (3) whether the board's violation of fiduciary
duty relates to policy concerns that are especially significant; and (4) whether the acquiror's
reliance interest under the challenged agreement merits protection in the event a court were to
declare the agreement unenforceable.'9
At first glance, these four factors seem eminently sensible. '' However,
the test presupposes that balancing the competing interests is the proper ap-
proach. This is not necessarily the case. Because fiduciary duties are intended
to protect shareholders from the directors and not third parties,192 arguably
there should be a strong presumption in favor of enforceability of contracts
negotiated with third parties at arm's length. On the other hand, because ac-
186 Paul L. Regan, Great Expectations? A Contract Law Analysis for Preclusive Corporate Lock-
Ups, 21 CARDOZO L. REv. I (1999).
187 Id. at 115.
188 See id. at 8-9.
189 See ACE Ltd. v. Capital Re Corp., 747 A.2d 95, 105-06 (Dcl. Ch. 1999).
190 See Regan, supra note 186, at 102.
191 It is worth noting, however, that Strine only considered three of the four factors. He gave no
reasons for not considering the fourth. See ACE, 747 A.2d at 106.
192 See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
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quisition agreements are fundamentally different than other types of con-
tracts in that they require shareholder approval' and generally involve the
"omnipresent specter" of action against the interests of shareholders,194 there
is a strong argument for allowing fiduciary duties to trump contractual ex-
pectations. Thus, rather than a straightforward balancing, the better approach
might be to presume the validity of most contracts but to give a strong pref-
erence to fiduciary duties with respect to acquisition agreements.
In any event, the factors Professor Regan suggested are not as useful as
they seem. They are more helpful in distinguishing acquisition agreements
from other contracts than they are in helping to distinguish among different
provisions in acquisition agreements. Fiduciary outs are found almost exclu-
sively in acquisition agreements. Thus, the test is not very helpful.
Let us consider the four factors individually. The first factor is "whether
the acquirer knew, or should have known, of the target board's breach of
fiduciary duty." 95 It is often impossible to say with any confidence that the
acquirer knows or should know of a breach. I say this not because fiduciary
duties are indeterminate; 9 6 I have argued that they are not.' Rather, because
the parties to acquisition agreements tend to push the boundaries of accepta-
bility while avoiding conduct that is known to be unacceptable, the law is
inevitably unclear. It is generally impossible to know that there has been a
breach of fiduciary duty. At most, it could be said that the acquirer should
know that there might be a breach of fiduciary duty. If that is the test, how-
ever, it will be satisfied in almost every case-or, at least, every interesting
case. Thus, the first factor does very little to distinguish legitimate lockups
or fiduciary outs from illegitimate ones.
The second factor is "whether the change of control transaction remains
pending or is already consummated at the time that judicial intervention is
sought."'98 In the vast majority of cases, the legal battle is fought at the in-
junction stage. No doubt, this is a testament to the importance of this factor.
However, it also means that this factor adds very little to the analysis.
The third factor suggested by Regan is "whether the board's violation
of fiduciary duty relates to policy concerns that are especially significant."' 9
This factor is better suited to distinguishing acquisition agreements from
other types of contracts. Acquisition agreements generally relate to policy
concerns that are especially significant.200 However, this factor provides little
guidance in distinguishing among different acquisition agreements.
193 See supra notes 109, 183 and accompanying text.
194 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
195 Regan, supra note 186, at 102-04.
196 See, e.g., Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in Corporate Law,
98 COLUM. L. REv. 1908, 1932-33 (1998).
197 See Vclasco, supra note 63, at 544-46.
198 Regan, supra note 186, at 102, 104-06.
199 Id. at 102, 106-07.
200 See infra note 232 and accompanying text.
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Regan's final factor is "whether the acquirer's reliance interest under
the challenged agreement merits protection in the event a court were to de-
clare the agreement unenforceable." 201 The idea, it seems, is that the acquirer,
as an innocent third party, should not necessarily be left empty-handed. Alt-
hough this concern is a legitimate one, the relevant issues can be addressed
in other ways. One example is the use of a termination fee. As mentioned
earlier, one effect of a fiduciary out provision is to allow portions of the ac-
quisition agreement-such as a termination fee-to survive even when the
underlying transaction does not.20 2 The termination fee acts as a form of liq-
uidated damages provision that compensates the acquirer for its losses if the
transaction is not consummated. 203 Thus, it ensures that the acquirer does not
go away empty-handed upon the exercise of a fiduciary out. This result seems
to be satisfactory to Regan. 204
Moreover, the acquirer is in a weaker position than most parties to a
contract. First, the acquisition agreement is not a binding contract until it is
ratified by the shareholders; thus, the acquirer's expectation interest is atten-
uated. Second, it may not be so innocent: the acquirer could be interpreted to
be a co-conspirator in the target board's breach of fiduciary duty.205 Thus, it
is conceivable that the acquirer should go away empty-handed. In fact, it is
possible that the termination fee itself could be part of an attempt to lock up
the transaction.206 If So, it should not be upheld.
As a result, Regan's fourth factor adds little to the analysis. Courts need
not worry about acquirers because they can protect themselves with a simple
termination fee. Rather than worrying about the acquirer, the courts should
focus on whether the shareholders are being harmed by the target directors.
The weakness of Regan's analysis in distinguishing among legitimate
acquisition agreements can be seen in the example that Regan offers to illus-
trate an application of the test. He applies the test to the facts of Paramount
Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc.2 07 However, his application is
deficient.
Briefly, the facts of the QVC case are as follows. 208 Paramount had been
searching for a strategic partner with which to merge.209 Prior to this case,
Paramount had failed in its effort to acquire Time, Inc. 2 10 Time had proposed
a strategic merger with Warner Bros., and Paramount sought to interrupt the
201 Regan, supra note 186, at 102, 107-11.
202 See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
203 See supra note 95.
204 See Regan, supra note 186, at 113-14.
205 See supra notes 184-85 and accompanying text.
206 See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 184 (Del. 1986).
207 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994).
208 See generally id at 37-41.
209 Id. at 38.
210 id
194 [VOL. 2 1:1
FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND FIDUCIARY OUTS
transaction with a superior offer.2 11 In order to protect the original deal, Time
and Warner restructured the transaction so as to avoid a shareholder vote.2 12
However, the Warner transaction never offered the Time shareholders con-
sideration superior to that offered by Paramount. 213 Nevertheless, in Para-
mount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc.,2 14 the court upheld the Time-
Warner transaction as part of a long-term strategic plan.215 Many interpreted
the court's opinion as holding that a "just say no" strategy-in which a cor-
poration could simply reject an unsolicited offer without offering sharehold-
ers a superior alternative-would be legally viable.216 Thereafter, Paramount
turned its attention to Viacom. 2 17 It negotiated a strategic merger with Viacom
and implemented deal protection devices to lock up that transaction. 218 QVC
stepped in and offered superior consideration for Paramount. 219 In the end,
Paramount's deal protection devices were struck down. 220 The court extended
the Revlon doctrine to hold that, whenever there is a sale of corporate control,
the directors have a duty to obtain the best price reasonably available. 22 1 Par-
amount was "for sale" because Viacom's majority shareholder would be-
come a majority shareholder of the combined company.222 Time, on the other
hand, was held not to be up for sale because there would not be a controlling
shareholder.223
For the first factor, Regan suggests that Paramount should have known
there was a breach of fiduciary duty with respect to the lockup. 224 However,
this is unfair. After the decision in Time, it seemed reasonable to assume that
a board of directors could "just say no" to a hostile bidder in order to imple-
ment a long-term strategic plan. 225 This is exactly what Paramount was trying
211 Paramount Commc'ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1147 (Del. 1989).
212 Id. at 1148.
213 id.
214 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
215 Id. at 1154-55.
216 Paramount Commc'ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 41 (Del. 1993).
217 Id. at 38.
218 Id at 39.
219 Id at 40.
220 Id at 51.
221 Id. at 44.
222 Q VC, 637 A.2d at 43.
223 Id. at 47.
224 See Regan, supra note 186, at 112.
225 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Unocal at 20: Director Primacy in Corporate Takeovers, 31 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 769, 849 (2006) ("[M]any commentators concluded Time validated the so-called 'just say no'
defense, pursuant to which the target's board simply refuses to allow the firm to be acquired, and backs
up that refusal by a poison pill or other takeover defenses."); see also Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Professional
Bear Hug: The ESB Proposal as a Conscious Effort to Make the Delaware Courts Confront the Basic
"Just Say No" Question, 55 STAN. L. REV. 863, 876 (2002) ("[T]he Time- Warner and Unitrin opinions
provided rhetorical support for the idea that corporate directors could block a bid simply because they
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to do. The QVC court asserted that "Viacom, a sophisticated party with ex-
perienced legal and financial advisors, knew of (and in fact demanded) the
unreasonable features of the Stock Option Agreement." 226 If by this the court
meant that Viacom knew or should have known that the features in question
would be considered unreasonable by the courts, then the court is wrong. The
QVC opinion marked a change in direction on the part of the Delaware
courts.227 Although the QVC and Revlon opinions can be (and were) harmo-
nized ex post, it would not have been easy to do this from an ex ante perspec-
tive. Thus, it cannot be said that Paramount knew or should have known that
it was breaching its fiduciary duties. The most that could be said is that Par-
amount knew that there was a risk that the courts would conclude that it had
breached its fiduciary duties. But that is always true in the acquisition con-
text.
With respect to the remaining points, Regan's analysis is fine but un-
helpful. He points out that the second factor would allow for judicial inter-
vention because the transaction was not yet complete. 2 8 This is typically the
case in acquisition litigation. For his third factor, Regan claims that there was
an "especially strong public policy concern" because "Viacom bargained
with notice of the special risks attending heightened judicial scrutiny of such
transactions." 229 In other words, as with the second factor, this factor will
generally be present in acquisitions. As for his fourth factor, Regan seems
satisfied that the survival of the negotiated termination fee adequately pro-
tected Viacom's interests.230
In short, Regan's illustration of the application of his test reaffirms the
view that it is not especially helpful. Although the four factors are insightful
in distinguishing acquisitions from other contracts, they are not helpful in
distinguishing among acquisition agreements and fiduciary outs.
3. Policy Justification
There are additional policy reasons why a fiduciary out makes sense in
the special context of an acquisition agreement. This Section briefly surveys
those reasons.
believed that the stockholders (although well-informed) might accept it, rather than follow the board's
more expert, negative view of the matter.").
226 QVC,637A.2dat5l.
227 See, e.g., Thomas A. Gentile, Refining the Revlon Doctrine's Applicability to Changes of Con-
trol: Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1993), 17 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 895, 895, 903 (1994) ("Prior to Q VC Network many observers had posited that the Court's
decision in Time had limited the universe of Revlon-triggering circumstances to include only the inevitable
dissolution of a corporate entity.").
228 See Regan, supra note 186, at 112.
229 Id
230 Seeid. at 113.
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First, the stakes in an acquisition agreement are higher than in most
other contracts. As the U.S. Supreme Court stated in Basic v. Levinson ,231
"[A] merger in which it is bought out is the most important event that can
occur in a small corporation's life, to wit, its death . . . ."232 Although it is
possible for another type of contract to be more significant, as a quantitative
matter, than an acquisition agreement, no other class of contracts is as im-
portant on a qualitative scale. It might make sense to allow fiduciary outs
because of the significance of acquisition agreements.
Moreover, acquisition agreements generally involve final period prob-
lems. 233 Thus, corporate management is significantly less trustworthy in this
context than in other situations. This suggests that courts should be less def-
erential when reviewing corporate action for breach of fiduciary duty in such
circumstances.
One final policy consideration that weighs in favor of fiduciary outs in
acquisition agreements is the result that follows. Fiduciary outs tend to allow
target companies out of a transaction if a superior offer comes along. This
rule encourages interested third parties to make superior offers. The result is
an auction of the target company-or at least a market test.234 An auction or
market test is beneficial because it is one of the best ways to ensure that
shareholders are getting the best value reasonably available. Courts were un-
willing to require an auction because, in theory, there may be other ways to
secure the best value.2 35 However, some academics might prefer to require an
auction.236 To them, it seems imprudent to defer to directors who may be con-
flicted and are, at least, structurally biased.237 An auction is an objective way
to be confident of the value of the target company. Although directors, in
their discretion, may be free to choose another path, shareholders also have
a say in such transactions. Shareholders can be expected to prefer an auction
or market test. The fiduciary out effectively gives this option to them. The
result is a situation in which we can be comfortable that the shareholders have
received the best value reasonably available. Although this result is not the
primary goal of fiduciary duties, it is nevertheless an affirmative good. More-
over, as previously discussed, the fiduciary out is aimed at ensuring that the
231 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
232 Id. at 238 (quoting SEC v. Geon Indus., Inc., 531 F.2d 39,47 (2d Cir. 1976)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
233 See generally Scan J. Griffith, Deal Protection Provisions in the Last Period of Play, 71
FORDHAM L. REv. 1899 (2003).
234 For purposes of this Article, I do not distinguish between the two. I distinguish between broad
attempts to secure the best price available on the one hand and attempts to negotiate with one or a few
parties toward a better price on the other. Although there were only two parties in this case, the facts
qualify for the former category: efforts were made to find additional bidders, but none could be found.
235 See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
236 See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, Comment, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers, 95
HARV. L. REv. 1028, 1050 (1982) ("[A] rule of auctioneering has significant benefits.").
237 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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shareholders are not abused by their directors who, by not seeking an auction
or market test, may have been derelict in their fiduciary duties.
Although fiduciary outs are inherently problematic (and indefensible
when applied to most contracts), they may nevertheless be appropriate (or at
least acceptable) in the special context of an acquisition agreement. However,
even in the context of an acquisition agreement, fiduciary outs must be as-
sessed carefully. The next Section illustrates the potential difficulties.
B. The Omnicare Decision
One of the most important cases dealing with fiduciary outs is Om-
nicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc.23 8 That case was decided by a divided
court, and the court's opinion is considered highly controversial.23 9 This Sec-
tion analyzes the opinion. Subsection 1 summarizes the facts of the case, as
well as the holding and the dissenting opinions. Subsection 2 presents the
argument, consistent with the analysis in this paper, as to why the case was
wrongly decided. Although those arguments have considerable force given
the facts of the case, Subsection 3 argues that the court's opinion may never-
theless be justifiable.
1. The Opinions
Because of changes in the healthcare industry, NCS Healthcare, Inc.
was experiencing serious financial difficulties beginning in 1999.240 By 2000,
the company was exploring strategic alternatives, including a sale of the com-
pany.2 41 Omnicare, Inc. was one of the few companies interested in purchas-
ing NCS. 242 In 2001, it offered to purchase the company's assets in a bank-
ruptcy sale. 243 Its offers were so low that they would not leave NCS share-
holders with anything, and would not even pay off all of the company's cred-
itors.244 The NCS board of directors did not consider the offers acceptable.2 45
238 818 A.2d 914 (Dcl. 2003).
239 See Bainbridge, supra note 225, at 831 ("Omnicare is proving to be a highly controversial deci-
sion."); Justin W. Oravetz, Comment, Is a Merger Agreement Ever Certain? The Impact ofthe Onicare
Decision on Deal Protection Devices, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 805, 841 (2004) ("The Omnicare decision is
one of the most controversial decisions in Delaware Supreme Court history .....
240 See Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 920.
241 id
242 See id. at 920-21.
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In early 2002, Genesis Health Ventures, Inc. entered the scene.246 It was
willing to enter into a negotiated merger agreement that would provide full
compensation to NCS creditors, as well as provide $24 million of value to
the company's shareholders. 247 However, Genesis was not willing to serve as
a "stalking horse" to allow NCS to secure a better offer from Omnicare.248
Genesis itself had recently emerged from bankruptcy and had lost a bidding
war to Omnicare in another transaction. 249 Therefore, it demanded an exclu-
sivity agreement as well as other deal protection devices. 25 0 As would later
come out in court: "[Genesis] wanted to have a pretty much bulletproof deal
or they were not going to go forward." 251 Given its lack of success with Om-
nicare, the NCS Independent Committee signed an exclusivity agreement
with Genesis. 25 2
When Omnicare learned of NCS negotiations with another buyer, it
made a better, but highly-conditional, offer.253 "Despite the exclusivity agree-
ment, the Independent Committee met to consider a response to Om-
nicare. "254 The Independent Committee decided to seek, and was able to ob-
tain, better terms from Genesis. 255 In return, however, Genesis demanded an
immediate acceptance of its offer and a complete lockup. 25 6 The Independent
Committee unanimously recommended acceptance of Genesis's offer:257
After receiving similar reports and advice from its legal and financial advisors, the [full Board
of Directors] concluded that "balancing the potential loss of the Genesis deal against the un-
certainty of Omnicarc's letter, results in the conclusion that the only reasonable alternative for
the Board of Directors is to approve the Genesis transaction."
258
After the transaction was executed, Omnicare filed a lawsuit attempting
to enjoin the merger and announced a conditional offer to acquire NCS at a
superior price.259 After further negotiations, Omnicare irrevocably committed
246 Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 921.
247 See id. at 922-23.
248 Id. at 922.
249 Id at 921.
250 See id. at 921-22.
251 Id. at 923.
252 See Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 922-23.





258 Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 925.
259 See id. at 926.
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itself to a transaction with NCS with terms superior to those offered by Gen-
esis. 260 However, because of the complete lockup obtained by Genesis, it was
impossible for the directors to accept Omnicare's superior offer.261
The lockup obtained by Genesis consisted of two important compo-
nents. First, there was a "force the vote" provision under section 251(c) of
the Delaware General Corporation Law, which required the directors to sub-
mit the merger agreement for shareholder approval, even if the directors
should change their minds regarding the advisability of the merger.262 Sec-
ond, the two majority shareholders granted to Genesis an irrevocable proxy
to vote their shares in favor of the merger.2 63 Thus, despite the existence of a
superior offer, the shareholders would get to vote on the merger and their
approval was a forgone conclusion.
The court held that this complete lockup was unenforceable under Del-
aware law.264 The court concluded that these deal protection devices were
subject to enhanced scrutiny under Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.26 5
Under the second prong of the Unocal test, a board's response "must be rea-
sonable in relation to the threat posed."2 6  Under Unitrin, Inc. v. American
General Corp. ,267a response that is either coercive or preclusive is draconian,
and therefore unreasonable.2 68 The combination of the two deal protection
devices mentioned above was considered to be both coercive and preclusive.
It was coercive because "NCS's public stockholders ... [would] be forced to
accept the Genesis merger because of the structural defenses approved by the
NCS board." 269 It was preclusive because it was "'mathematically impossi-
ble' and 'realistically unattainable' for the Omnicare transaction or any other
proposal to succeed, no matter how superior the proposal." 270
The court also held "that the NCS board did not have authority to accede
to the Genesis demand for an absolute 'lock-up."' 271 "Instead . . . the NCS
board was required to negotiate a fiduciary out clause to protect the NCS
stockholders if the Genesis transaction became an inferior offer." 272 Without
a fiduciary out, the combination of deal protection provisions in the Genesis
"agreement completely prevented the board from discharging its fiduciary
260 Seeid.
261 See id. at 927.
262 See id at 925.
263 See id at 926.
264 See Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 936.
265 Id. at 934; 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
266 Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955.
267 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995).
268 Id. at 1387-88.
269 Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 935-36.
270 Id. at 936.
271 Id. at 938.
272 id
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responsibilities to the minority stockholders when Omnicare presented its su-
perior transaction." 273
The majority opinion was accompanied by heated dissents. Chief Jus-
tice Norman Veasey objected to the creation of a per se ban on complete
lockups.274 Chief Justice Veasey concluded that "a joint decision by the con-
trolling stockholders and the board of directors to secure what appeared to be
the only value-enhancing transaction available for a company on the brink of
bankruptcy" 275 should be upheld. Justice Steele authored a second dissent in
which he emphasized the good faith on the part of the directors.276 He argued
"that the absence of a suggestion of self-interest or lack of care [should] com-
pel[] a court to defer to what is a business judgment that a court is not quali-
fied to second guess." 277
2. Was Omnicare Wrongly Decided?
This Article's thesis is that fiduciary outs, as a contractual proxy for
fiduciary duties, should serve the purpose of protecting shareholders from
abuse at the hands of their directors. They should not, except incidentally,
protect shareholders from third parties or bad deals. If this premise is ac-
cepted, one could easily conclude that Omnicare was wrongly decided.
There is no plausible argument that the directors of NCS abused the
shareholders, whether by shirking, self-dealing, or misconduct. To the con-
trary, the directors were clearly seeking the best value reasonably available
to shareholders. 278 In fact, they were seeking value for shareholders in cir-
cumstances where it was arguably unreasonable for them to expect any.279 No
arguments were raised, nor were any plausible arguments available, that the
directors were not acting in subjective good faith. Moreover, given the cir-
cumstances, there was no structural bias argument, either: the directors were
not seeking to close the transaction with Genesis because they preferred Gen-
esis management to Omnicare management. 280 It was a pure sale in which
they sought to maximize value to shareholders. If they failed to get the best
price available, it was not for a lack of effort. A board with purer intentions,
273 Id. at 936.
274 See id at 942-43 (Veasey, C.J., dissenting).
275 Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 940 (Veasey, C.J., dissenting).
276 See id. at 946-47, 949-50 (Steele, J. dissenting).
277 Id. at 949.
278 See supra notes 238-54 and accompanying text.
279 See Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 921 ("At that time, full recovery for NCS's creditors was a remote
prospect, and any recovery for NCS stockholders seemed impossible.").
280 See Sean J. Griffith, The Costs and Benefits of Precommitment: An Appraisal of Omnicare v.
NCS Healthcare, 29 J. CORP. L. 569, 588 (2004) ("The specter of entrenchment thus does not seem to
have been present in Omnicare.").
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or one that was more faithful, could hardly be imagined. For this reason
alone, one would expect the courts to uphold the board's decisions.28 '
Some scholars believe that an auction, or a process similar to an auction,
should be required in every sale. 282 To the extent that these concerns have any
bearing on the decision, the NCS/Genesis transaction should have been up-
held. Although NCS did not actually conduct an auction, it had been search-
ing actively for an acquirer for well over a year. 283 There was no suggestion
that this effort fell short in any respect. In fact, because NCS was "on the
brink of bankruptcy," 284 its only interest was to secure as much consideration
in a sale as was possible. After a long search, the deal offered by Genesis was
the best one available.285 NCS had sought a deal with Omnicare, but Om-
nicare was playing hardball. Omnicare offered very little consideration, and
it could not be persuaded to improve its offer.28 6 At the time the exclusivity
agreement with Genesis was signed, it offered the best value reasonably
available-by far.287 Only after the deal was signed did Omnicare attempt to
offer more. Even then, its offer continued to have a due diligence condition
for a while-making it risky, and hence not clearly superior. 288 Arguably, it
would have been unreasonable for the NCS directors to have done anything
differently.
Furthermore, I have argued that the role of the fiduciary out is to protect
the shareholder right to vote on the transaction. 28 9 However, the NCS/Genesis
transaction should have been upheld based on this criterion. Although the
court tried to paint a different picture, the shareholders were able to vote
freely on the transaction-and in fact they did So!290 Shareholders represent-
281 See Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 946 (Steele, J., dissenting).
282 See supra note 236 and accompanying text.
283 See Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 920, 924 (began in February 2000 and concluded in July 2002).
284 See id. at 940 (Veasey, C.J., dissenting).
285 See id at 925 (majority opinion) ("After receiving similar reports and advice from its legal and
financial advisors, the board concluded that 'balancing the potential loss of the Genesis deal against the
uncertainty ofOmnicare's letter, results in the conclusion that the only reasonable alternative for the Board
of Directors is to approve the Genesis transaction."').
286 See id at 921 ("Omnicare responded that it was not interested in any transaction other than an
asset sale in bankruptcy.").
287 See id at 941 (Veasey, C.J., dissenting) ("Negotiations with Genesis led to an offer paying cred-
itors off and conferring on NCS stockholders $24 million-an amount infinitely superior to the prior
Omnicare proposals.").
288 See id at 924 (majority opinion); id. at 948 (Steele, J., dissenting) ("At the time the NCS board
and the majority stockholders agreed to a voting lockup, the terms were the best reasonably available for
all the stockholders, balanced against a genuine risk of no deal at all.").
289 See supra Part IV.A. I.
290 See Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 944-45 (Vcascy, C.J., dissenting).
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ing the majority of the outstanding shares voluntarily approved the transac-
tion.291 The only difference was that they did so immediately. That the mi-
nority shareholders would be "forced" to accept the transaction is irrelevant:
minority shareholders are always forced to accept the vote of the majority. 292
If there were any indication that the vote of the majority block was not free,
there might have been a reason for the court to interfere with the transaction.
However, there was no such indication. Thus, the transaction should not have
been rejected based on shareholder voting rights.
The Omnicare opinion is difficult to understand because it does not truly
champion shareholder voting rights. It cannot even be said to have champi-
oned minority shareholder voting rights. The fact is that, in the Genesis trans-
action, each shareholder would have been permitted to vote as he pleased,
without any type of coercion.
The value that the Omnicare opinion seems to uphold in the end is the
right to some sort of delay between the director vote and the shareholder vote.
Every shareholder could have voted freely, but perhaps the majority share-
holders voted too soon: they delivered irrevocable proxies before the actual
vote. 293 There are two problems with this argument. First, irrevocable proxies
are legitimate under circumstances such as these. 294 Second, there is no basis
in law to require any delay before a shareholder vote.295 Delays are nearly
ubiquitous not because they are required by law, but simply because they are
necessary as a practical matter.296 Perhaps the courts can simply create a
shareholder right to a delayed vote. But what purpose would this serve? The
most obvious purpose would be to allow time for an auction or market test to
transpire. However, auctions and market tests are not demanded by the
courts. 297 Moreover, even if such a requirement would make sense in many
transactions, it would not be true in this case: there had already been a lengthy
search for a buyer. Therefore, requiring a delay that is not mandated by law
would be unnecessary and inappropriate.
291 See id. at 944 ("[T]he NCS controlling stockholders ... made an informed choice to commit their
voting power to the merger.").
292 See id. at 944-45 ("The minority stockholders were deemed to know that when controlling stock-
holders have 65% of the vote they can approve a merger without the need for the minority votes. Moreo-
ver, to the extent a minority stockholder may have felt 'coerced' to vote for the merger, which was already
afait accompli, it was a meaningless coercion-or no coercion at all-because the controlling votes . . .
were already 'cast."').
293 See id. at 926 (majority opinion).
294 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 212(e) (2011).
295 Transcript of Oral Argument at 127, Optima Int'l of Miami, Inc. v. WCI Steel, Inc., No. 3833-
VCL (Del. Ch. June 27, 2008), available at http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/mergers/files/-
0702120713_001.pdf ("Nothing in the DGCL requires any particular period of time between a board's
authorization of a merger agreement and the necessary stockholder vote.").
296 For example, federal securities law requires the preparation, filing, review, and distribution of
proxy statements. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-3, -6 (2008).
297 See supra note 115.
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By requiring a delay, the court effectively mandated a post-signing mar-
ket test---even though there had already been a good faith search for the best
value available. The problem with such a rule is that it undermines director
authority to seek the best price. The advantages of an English auction 29 -
where bidders continuously attempt to top each other-and a blind auc-
tion299-where bidders secretly submit their best offers--can be debated, but
the court's holding seems to require the former. Under this rule, bidders have
no incentive to offer the best price before signing because they know the deal
remains vulnerable to a topping bid. Regardless of the merits of this ap-
proach, it does not seem appropriate for a court of equity to be making this
type of business decision-especially not on a per se basis.
Based on the foregoing arguments, it would seem that Omnicare was
wrongly decided. In fact, my sympathies lie in that direction. Fiduciary outs
are inherently problematic, and although they may be justifiable in acquisi-
tion transactions, the facts of this particular case do not support a breach of
fiduciary duty or the invocation of a fiduciary out provision. Nevertheless,
the holding in Omnicare may be defensible on other grounds.
3. Justification for Omnicare
The facts of Omnicare make it a rare case.3 00 There is no suggestion of
any conflict of interest or even of structural bias on the part of the target
directors. Nor is there any suggestion whatsoever that the directors were not
acting in subjective good faith. In fact, other than the complete lockup itself,
which was struck down by the court, there is no suggestion that they breached
any fiduciary duty--even when judged by the standards of conduct rather
than the standards of review. Therefore, this case does not turn upon the di-
rectors' conduct. Rather, the case boils down to the question of whether com-
plete lockups should be permissible, or whether they must be accompanied
by a fiduciary out. The holding amounts to a per se rule against complete
lockups.30
Another way in which the Omnicare case is special is the fact that the
directors had actively sought the best value available. They had specifically
negotiated with the hostile bidder. Omnicare simply failed to make the best
offer. There was no claim of unfairness in those procedures. In a sense, the
298 English Auction, GAMETHEORY.NET, http://www.gamctheory.net/dictionary/auctions/English
Auction.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2013); see also VIJAY KRISHNA, AUCTION THEORY 2 (2002) (describ-
ing English auctions).
299 Blind Auction, GAMETHEORY.NET, http://www.gametheory.net/dictionary/auctions/BlindAuc-
tion.html (last visited Sept. 27,2013); see also KRISHNA, supra note 298, at 2 (describing scaled-bid, first-
price auctions).
300 See Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 939 (Del. 2003) (Veasey, C.J., dis-
senting) ("[T]he peculiar facts presented render this case an unlikely candidate for substantial repetition.").
301 See id. at 942-43.
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question became whether a hostile bidder should be able to run around the
procedures of the target directors that were undeniably fair and actually in-
tended to obtain the best price available for shareholders.
In these two important respects, the Omnicare case was uncommon. In
most cases, a claim of structural bias, if not disloyalty, can be raised. Like-
wise, in many cases in which the hospital bidder loses, there is some claim
of procedural unfairness. Because Omnicare is such a rare case, it might seem
an appropriate candidate for an exception to an established rule, particularly
one in equity.3 02 However, it is precisely because it is such a rare case that it
may be unwise to create an exception. An exception, once established, may
grow beyond its intended limits.3 03 An exception that was originally intended
to be applied rarely might end up becoming rather commonplace, to the det-
riment of the law. If that is a significant risk, it might make more sense not
to create the exception.
In corporate law, there is a great risk that an exception could swallow
the rule because of the business judgment rule. In close cases, and even not-
so-close cases, the courts tend to defer to the directors.04 Thus, a balancing
test could lead to the wrong result in most cases. The problem seems to lie in
the burden of proof. Assume, for example, that a fiduciary out ought to be
required unless it is clear that the directors have acted entirely in good faith.
The problem remains that, in most cases, it is difficult to determine whether
subjective good faith is present. The business judgment rule reflects a con-
scious decision on the part of the courts to assume that directors have acted
in good faith. Shareholders therefore have the heavy burden of proving di-
rector misconduct. As an unavoidable result of the business judgment rule,
fiduciary outs would not be required unless the shareholders can prove that
directors have not acted in good faith-even though the better rule would be
that fiduciary outs are required unless directors can prove that they have acted
in good faith. Because of this dynamic, it would be better to have a per se
rule requiring fiduciary outs. A per se rule might lead to a bad result in a rare
case, but it would lead to the correct result in most cases.
The argument can be illustrated with an arbitrary numerical example.
Assume that the target directors can prove they have acted in good faith only
302 Cf Speiser v. Baker, 525 A.2d 1001, 1011 (Del. Ch. 1987) ("[O]ur law is the polar opposite of
technical and literal when the fiduciary duties of corporate officers and directors are involved."); Leo E.
Strine, Jr., If Corporate Action Is Lawful, Presumably There Are Circumstances in Which It Is Equitable
to Take that Action: The Implicit Corollary to the Rule ofSchnell v. Chris-Craft, 60 BUS. LAW. 877, 902
(2005) ("[Omnicare's] reasoning renders indistinct the line between law and equity .... ).
303 Cf Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) ("Uncompromising rigidity has been the
attitude of courts of equity when petitioned to undermine the rule of undivided loyalty by the 'disintegrat-
ing erosion' of particular exceptions.").
304 See, e.g., Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 249 (Del. 2000) (dismissing the case on pleadings
despite acknowledging that it was "a close case" and "potentially a very troubling case on the merits,"
and even that the facts "pushe[d] the envelope ofjudicial respect for the business judgment of directors in
making compensation decisions").
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15% of the time, that shareholders can prove that the directors have not acted
in good faith another 15% of the time, and that the truth eludes proof the
remaining 70% of the time.305 Under such assumptions, the ideal rule might
require a fiduciary out 85% of the time (i.e., to protect shareholders in every
case in which directors cannot clearly establish their own good faith). How-
ever, because of the deference of the business judgment rule, a balancing test
would result in fiduciary outs being required only 15% of the time (i.e., in
cases in which shareholders cannot establish that the directors lacked good
faith). Under such circumstances, a reasonable person could prefer a per se
rule over a balancing test. A per se rule would lead to an inappropriate result
only 15% of the time, whereas a balancing test would lead to an inappropriate
result 70% of the time.
Thus, perhaps the question should not be whether Omnicare was cor-
rectly decided on the facts. Instead, the question should be what rule of law
would be best as a practical matter. Arguably, the best rule of law would be
to require fiduciary outs in most cases, in order to protect the shareholder
right to vote. By this standard, a per se rule may be superior to a balancing
test. If so, then perhaps Omnicare was correctly decided on the law.
V. OTHER CONTEXTS
Thus far, the Article has argued as follows: fiduciary outs are contrac-
tual proxies for fiduciary duties; they are inherently problematic conceptu-
ally; nevertheless, they may be appropriate in acquisition agreements because
of the unique circumstances involved; and, although there may be cases in
which a complete lockup may make sense, it may also be reasonable to apply
a per se rule against them. Since most contracts do not share the unique cir-
cumstances of acquisition agreements, the inherently problematic nature of
fiduciary outs provides a strong argument against exporting the concept to
other contracts.
This Part reviews a case in which the Delaware Supreme Court exported
the concept of fiduciary out to another context. In CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Em-
ployees Pension Plan, the Delaware Supreme Court seemed to demand a fi-
duciary out in the context of a shareholder-proposed bylaw.306 This Part ar-
gues that the Delaware Supreme Court's decision was not only misguided,
but actually dangerous-both in the context of that particular case and more
generally.3 07
305 In acquisitions, that 70% is often tainted with structural bias. See supra note 3 and accompanying
text.
306 See 953 A.2d 227, 240 (Del. 2008).
307 For another article taking a similar position, see generally Sabrina Ursaner, Keeping "Fiduciary
Outs" Out ofShareholder-Proposed Bylaws: An Analysis ofCA, Inc. v. AFSCME, 6 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus.
479 (2010).
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Section A summarizes the facts of the case and the court's opinion. Sec-
tion B argues that the case was wrongly decided with respect to proxy contest
reimbursement bylaws. Section C explains why the court's holding is mis-
guided and even perverse in more general terms.
A. The Case
The facts of CA are straightforward because the case arose as certified
questions from the SEC.3 08 Shareholders of CA, Inc. sought to include a pro-
posal to amend corporate bylaws on management's proxy, but management
wanted to exclude the shareholder proposal.3 09 The SEC had to determine
whether the proposal could be excluded.310 Under the federal proxy rules,
there are various grounds on which a shareholder proposal could be ex-
cluded.3"' The two most relevant were "if the proposal is not a proper subject
for action by shareholders under [state law],"3"2 and "if the proposal would,
if implemented, cause the company to violate any state. . . law to which it is
subject.""' Rather than try to answer these questions itself, the SEC decided
to certify these questions to the Delaware Supreme Court.
The shareholder proposal would have amended the company's bylaws
to require the directors, under certain circumstances, to cause the corporation
to reimburse shareholders for reasonable expenses incurred in nominating
candidates for a contested election of directors.3 14 Because the court was
faced with certified questions of law, there were no facts to contextualize the
issues. As the court put it, "[tihe certified questions . . . request a determina-
tion of the validity of the Bylaw in the abstract.""
As to the first issue-whether the proposal was a proper subject for ac-
tion by the shareholders-the court upheld the proposed bylaw.316 The court's
reasoning, in brief, was as follows:
The shareholders of a Delaware corporation have the right "to participate in selecting the con-
testants" for election to the board. The shareholders are entitled to facilitate the exercise of that
right by proposing a bylaw that would encourage candidates other than board-sponsored nom-
inees to stand for election. The Bylaw would accomplish that by committing the corporation
to reimburse the election expenses of shareholders whose candidates are successfully elected.
308 See CA, 953 A.2d at 229-30.
309 Id.
310 Id. at 230.
311 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2008).
312 Id. § 240.14a-8(i)(1).
313 Id. § 240.14a-8(i)(2).
314 CA, 953 A.2d at 230.
315 Id at 238.
316 Id at 237.
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That the implementation of that proposal would require the expenditure of corporate funds will
not, in and of itself, make such a bylaw an improper subject matter for shareholder action.'"
As to the second issue, however-whether the bylaw would cause the
company to violate any state law-the court ruled against the shareholder
proposal."'t The court "conclude[d] that the Bylaw, as drafted, would violate
the prohibition, which our decisions have derived from Section 141(a),
against contractual arrangements that commit the board of directors to a
course of action that would preclude them from fully discharging their fidu-
ciary duties to the corporation and its shareholders." 19 It reasoned as follows:
Under Delaware law, a board may expend corporate funds to reimburse proxy expenses
"[w]hcre the controversy is concerned with a question of policy as distinguished from person-
ncl o[r] management." But in a situation where the proxy contest is motivated by personal or
petty concerns, or to promote interests that do not further, or are adverse to, those of the cor-
poration, the board's fiduciary duty could compel that reimbursement be denied altogether...
... [Tihe Bylaw contains no language or provision that would reserve to CA's directors their
full power to exercise their fiduciary duty to decide whether or not it would be appropriate, in
a specific case, to award reimbursement at all.320
Thus, the court concluded that the bylaw, if implemented, could require di-
rectors to breach their fiduciary duties and, thus, to violate state law.32'
B. Proxy Reimbursement Bylaws
This Section considers whether the court's holding was appropriate in
the context of proxy expense reimbursement bylaw provisions. Because the
court concluded that the provision involved "a proper subject for shareholder
action,"322 this Section focuses on the second provision considered by the
court: whether the proposed bylaw "would cause [the company] to violate
any Delaware law to which it is subject."323
The court concluded that "the Bylaw, as drafted, would violate the pro-
hibition, which our decisions have derived from Section 141(a), against con-
tractual arrangements that commit the board of directors to a course of action
that would preclude them from fully discharging their fiduciary duties to the
corporation and its shareholders." 324 Part of the reason for this decision was
317 id
318 Id. at 240.
319 Id. at 238.
320 CA, 953 A.2d at 240 (footnotes omitted).
321 See id at 238.
322 Id. at 236.
323 Id. at 237.
324 Id at 238.
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the "abstract" nature of the challenge arising in a certified question: "we must
necessarily consider any possible circumstance under which a board of di-
rectors might be required to act [in breach of fiduciary duty]." 325 This was an
odd conclusion on the part of the court. The more appropriate approach to a
facial challenge would be to ask whether the provision is valid in some cir-
cumstances, leaving later courts to decide whether it is inappropriate as ap-
plied to any particular case. 326 In fact, Justice Jacobs, the author of the major-
ity opinion in CA, has suggested that this may have been a poor choice on the
part of the court, made as a result of the rushed nature of the proceedings. 3 27
As interesting as this debate may be, it is not relevant to the discussion of
fiduciary outs in principle. Therefore, this Article does not address this issue
in depth. Rather, it argues that fiduciary outs are inappropriate in the bylaw
context.
According to the court, the reason that the proposed bylaw could require
directors to breach their fiduciary duties is as follows:
Under Delaware law, a board may expend corporate funds to reimburse proxy expenses
"[w]here the controversy is concerned with a question of policy as distinguished from person-
nel o[r] management." But in a situation where the proxy contest is motivated by personal or
petty concerns, or to promote interests that do not further, or are adverse to, those of the cor-
poration, the board's fiduciary duty could compel that reimbursement be denied altogether. 328
This rationale is inadequate, both as a legal matter and as a matter of common
sense.
As a legal matter, there is no specific statutory provision that requires
directors to make a determination as to the validity of a proxy expense reim-
bursement. From the perspective of the statute, proxy expenses are no differ-
ent from any other expenses. The court had already decided that bylaws could
require expenditures.3 29
The court seems to suggest, but does not quite say explicitly, that the
directors' power, and corresponding fiduciary duty, to make determinations
325 id.
326 See Frantz Mfg. Co. v. EAC Indus., 501 A.2d 401, 407 (Del. 1985) ("The bylaws of a corporation
arc presumed to be valid, and the courts will construe the bylaws in a manner consistent with the law
rather than strike down the bylaws.").
327 Holger Spamann, Justice Jack Jacobs at Harvard Law School, HARVARD LAW SCH. FORUM ON
CORP. GOVERNANCE AND FIN. REGULATION, at 58:27-1:00:23 (Dec. 2, 2008, 10:05 AM),
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2008/12/02/justice-jack-jacobs-at-harvard-law-school/; cf CA, 953
A.2d at 238 ("Were this issue being presented in the course of litigation involving the application of the
Bylaw to a specific set of facts, we would start with the presumption that the Bylaw is valid and, if possi-
ble, construe it in a manner consistent with the law."). Justice Jacobs also seems to acknowledge that the
likelihood of the bylaws being problematic in an actual case or controversy was slim. See, e.g., Spamann,
supra, at 52:50 ("There at least was a subset, maybe a very small subset, of cases where arguably fiduciary
duty would be breached .... .").
328 CA, 953 A.2d at 240 (footnote omitted).
329 See supra note 317 and accompanying text.
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regarding the advisability of proxy reimbursement stems directly from sec-
tion 141(a).33 0 That section provides that "[t]he business and affairs of every
corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the
direction of a board of directors.""' It has been interpreted as a core provision
of Delaware General Corporation Law,33 2 empowering directors very
broadly. Ultimately, of course, most director powers stem from that provi-
sion. However, that provision has very little to say about any particular ex-
penditures, such as proxy reimbursements. It is simply a broad grant of
power.
The rule that the court raises is not a matter of law, but rather of equity.
It is a restriction that is imposed upon directors as a matter of fiduciary
duty.333 Therefore, the rule should be interpreted consistently with the pur-
poses of fiduciary duties: to protect shareholders from abuse at the hands of
directors. As an equitable rule arising out of fiduciary duties, the rule should
apply only to the actions of directors, not those of shareholders.
"It is well-settled that a corporation may, through its board of directors,
expend reasonable sums in a contested election of directors in the solicitation
of proxies where the expenditures are in the interest of intelligent exercise of
judgment by its shareholders."33 4 This rule applies even though the directors
are conflicted in that the proxy contest will decide whether or not they keep
their positions. However, in order to prevent directors from abusing this
power, the courts imposed a limitation upon such expenditures: to justify the
expense, there must be a benefit to the shareholders. The line that the courts
have drawn is that there is no benefit if the proxy contest is about purely
personnel matters, and there is a benefit if the proxy contest is about policy
matters.335
Essentially, this rule is a prohibition against self-dealing on the part of
directors in the context of a proxy contest. However, the rule was futile ab
initio. As the court should have been able to imagine, the difference between
330 See CA, 953 A.2d at 238 (describing the rule of equity at issue as "derived from Section 141(a)");
see also id. at 240 ("[W]e express no view on whether the Bylaw as currently drafted ... would create a
better governance scheme from a policy standpoint. We decide only what is, and is not, legally permitted
under the DGCL. That statute, as currently drafted, is the expression ofpolicy as decreed by the Delaware
legislature.").
331 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2011).
332 See CA, 953 A.2d at 232 n.7 ("[T]he board's managerial authority under Section 141(a) is a car-
dinal precept of the DGCL .... ); McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 916 (Del. 2000) ("One of the
fundamental principles of the Delaware General Corporation Law statute is that business affairs of a cor-
poration are managed by or under the direction of its board of directors."); Quickturn Design Sys., Inc. v.
Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281, 1291-92 (Del. 1998) ("One of the most basic tenets of Delaware corporate law
is that the board of directors has the ultimate responsibility for managing the business and affairs of a
corporation.").
333 See CA, 953 A.2d at 240.
334 5 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS § 2052.90 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 2003).
335 See supra note 328.
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policy and personnel matters is difficult to sustain.3 6 Any restrictions the dis-
tinction might impose could be avoided easily because it would not be diffi-
cult to frame any proxy contest as involving some policy matter. As a leading
treatise states, "[n]o decision has been found in which the court has enjoined
management's proxy contest expenditures." 37 In other words, the rule was
entirely ineffective.3
To apply this rule in the context of a mandatory reimbursement bylaw
is not simply misguided, but actually perverse. It is misguided because it does
not serve the purpose of fiduciary duties to invoke this principle. As the court
stated,
The context of the Bylaw at issue here is the process for electing directors a subject in which
shareholders of Delaware corporations have a legitimate and protected interest. The purpose
of the Bylaw is to promote the integrity of that election process by facilitating the nomination
of director candidates by stockholders or groups of stockholders."'
In other words, the shareholder proposal was an attempt by shareholders to
protect themselves from the directors. Invoking the equitable rule against re-
imbursement of proxy expenses furthers neither this goal nor the goal of fi-
duciary duties generally. In fact, to apply the rule in this context would work
against both of these goals and thus would be perverse. Because the pol-
icy/personnel distinction is so elusive, directors would be able to argue, more
often than appropriate, that there are no policy issues at stake, only personnel
issues, and that reimbursement is therefore inappropriate.3 40 If Courts are def-
erential, this would allow the directors, in at least some cases, to deny the
336 See Cox & HAZEN, supra note 133, § 13.28, at 783 ("In most contests for corporate control . . .
it is impossible to sever questions of policy from personality because questions of policy usually are in-
exorably intertwined with personalities. Thus, the courts have had difficulty drawing a line between the
two.").
337 Id.
338 See RANDALL S. THOMAS & CATHERIN T. DIXON, ARONOW & AINHORD ON PROXY CONTESTS
FOR CORPORATE CONTROL § 21.03[A], at 21-13 (3d ed. Supp. 2001) ("In short, the policy/personal dis-
tinction places virtually no limitations on management's ability to expend corporate funds.").
339 CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 237 (Del. 2008) (footnote omitted).
340 If the policy/personnel distinction is meaningless, then directors should never be able to prevent
reimbursement for shareholders' candidates, just as they have not been denied reimbursement in other
situations. See supra note 337 and accompanying text.
In a footnote, the CA court proposes a hypothetical in which the denial of reimbursement might
be appropriate:
Such a circumstance could arise, for example, if a shareholder group affiliated with a compet-
itor of the company were to cause the election of a minority slate of candidates committed to
using their director positions to obtain, and then communicate, valuable proprietary strategic
or product information to the competitor.
CA, 953 A.2d at 240 n.34. In addition to being far-fetched, the hypothetical fails on the merits. Although
the result contemplated by the hypothetical would be against the shareholders' interests, fiduciary duties
do not exist to guarantee good results. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. Despite a bad result,
directors are bound by their legitimate obligations, whether they arise under law or contract. Just as the
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reimbursement that shareholders thought necessary-and this would be true
despite the fact that the directors are inherently conflicted with respect to
proxy contests.
The irony is palpable. The fiduciary duty rule that was intended to pro-
tect shareholders from the directors in proxy contests, but which failed mis-
erably, was reinvigorated so as to allow directors to protect themselves from
shareholders in proxy contests. In other words, the court turned a rule that
was supposed to be a shield for the benefit of shareholders into a sword for
the benefit of directors.
Perhaps the worst aspect of the court's decision is that it had the effect
of blocking the bylaw proposal altogether. Even accepting the court's ra-
tionale for the sake of argument, a more appropriate application of the prin-
ciple would be to allow the bylaw, and to allow directors to avoid payments
in appropriate cases. In other words, the courts could block the application of
any bylaw in cases where it would require a breach of fiduciary duty. Instead,
the court's opinion prevented the shareholder proposal from being adopted
at all. It should not have done so on the basis of hypothetical possibilities.3 4 1
According to the court, the proposed bylaw was otherwise a valid pro-
vision.3 42 The only problem was that it might require the directors to breach
their fiduciary duties. However, the purpose of fiduciary duties was not of-
fended by the bylaws, and the rule that the courts relied upon was a particu-
larly weak basis for rejecting the shareholder proposal. Thus, on its particular
facts, the CA case was wrongly decided.
C. Implications of the CA Ruling
As a general matter, the court's holding is problematic because it fun-
damentally misunderstands the purpose of fiduciary duties. Fiduciary duties
are duties imposed upon directors in order to prevent them from abusing
shareholders with powers that have been entrusted to them. Fiduciary duties
are duties, not powers. They limit what directors can do with other valid pow-
ers; they do not grant the directors new powers. Yet this is exactly what the
court's opinion seems to do. It gives directors the power to avoid an other-
wise valid bylaw provision.
directors could not refuse to seat such ill-motivated directors, neither should they be able to deny rcim-
bursement. The proper remedy lics elsewhere. Such communication would result in a breach of fiduciary
duty on the part of the newly clected directors, and the proper course of action would be for the directors
to seek some sort of equitable relief from the courts. Any relief that is given by the courts would-or at
least should-be based on the newly elected directors' breach of fiduciary duty, not the incumbent direc-
tors' powers to exercise their fiduciary duties. Directors do not have any "power to exercise their fiduciary
duties." See infra text accompanying note 353.
341 See supra note 327.
342 See supra note 317 and accompanying text.
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A fiduciary duty is a limit on a discretionary power.3 43 To the extent that
directors are free to decide whether or not to do something, the court may
decide that they have fiduciary duties with respect to the exercise of that
power. However, to the extent that the directors do not have discretion with
respect to a matter (e.g., to the extent that there is a valid obligation), fiduci-
ary duties are not relevant. Directors must comply with corporate obligations.
To do so is not a breach of fiduciary duty; to the contrary, not satisfying
corporate obligations could be a breach of fiduciary duty. So, to the extent
that a bylaw provision, or any other contractual provision, is valid-and, in
this case, the court concluded that it was, in other respects 344-the board can-
not breach fiduciary duties by complying therewith.345
The plaintiffs raised this argument before the court:
Because the Bylaw would remove the subject of election expense reimbursement (in circum-
stances as defined by the Bylaw) entirely from the CA's board's discretion (AFSCME argues),
it cannot fairly be claimed that the directors would be precluded from discharging their fidu-
ciary duty. Stated differently, AFSCME argues that it is unfair to claim that the Bylaw prevents
the CA board from discharging its fiduciary duty where the effect of the Bylaw is to relieve
the board entirely of those duties in this specific area.
3 46
The court improperly dismissed the argument as "more semantical than sub-
stantive."3 47 However, the argument goes beyond semantics and straight to
the substantive core of fiduciary duties. The court is wrong to suggest that
"the Bylaw mandates reimbursement of election expenses in circumstances
that a proper application of fiduciary principles could preclude."3 48 Fiduciary
duties neither could nor should preclude a mandatory payment.
The court had already decided, in the first certified issue, that the bylaw
was legitimate even though it required certain expenditures.3 49 The court's
issue with the proposed bylaw was not that all expenditures must be subjected
to director review. In fact, it specifically rejected this argument.3 0 The inval-
idation of the bylaw was based entirely on the fiduciary duty rule that pre-
343 See supra Part II.A and accompanying text.
34 See CA, 953 A.2d at 237.
345 See Brett H. McDonnell, Setting Optimal Rules for Shareholder Proxy Access, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
67, 98-99 (2011) (describing the court's reasoning as "stupefying" and arguing that, if shareholders es-
tablish "a rule that is within their power to set, then the board's fiduciary duty comes to an end on that
matter").
346 CA, 953 A.2d at 239.
347 id
348 Id. at 240.
349 See id. at 237.
350 Id. at 236 ("[A] bylaw that requires the expenditure of corporate funds does not, for that reason
alone, become automatically deprived of its process-related character.").
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vents directors from using corporate funds to pay for proxy contests involv-
ing solely personnel issues."5 ' However, that rule was developed to limit di-
rector discretion, not to empower directors.
By legitimately making reimbursement a mandatory obligation, the by-
law removed director discretion-and, therefore, fiduciary duties-from the
equation. The question was no longer whether directors might abuse share-
holders by using corporate funds to pay for proxy solicitation expenses when
they might involve solely personnel issues.3 52 The question became whether
fiduciary duties should empower directors to avoid payment of an otherwise
valid obligation. The answer to that question must be no.
Allowing the fiduciary duty rule to trump the otherwise valid bylaw
would empower directors to block action by shareholders intended to protect
themselves from the directors, and to do so with arguments that lack any
credibility. Supposedly, this would be done in the name of fiduciary duties.
However, there is no need to worry about abuse at the hands of directors in
the enforcement of the proposed bylaw. To the contrary, it would be the abil-
ity to avoid the obligations established by the bylaw that could lead to abuse.
The court's emphasis on director "power to exercise their fiduciary duty
to decide""' is misguided. Directors do not have power to exercise fiduciary
duties; they have fiduciary duties to exercise their powers properly. Fiduci-
ary duties do not give directors power to do anything that they are not other-
wise empowered to do. To the contrary, they limit what directors are other-
wise empowered to do. Thus, this passage can only mean that directors can-
not limit themselves when their fiduciary duties require freedom to act, as by
entering into obligations that would have that effect.35 4 However, share-
holder-adopted bylaws can obligate the directors just as surely as the law and
the charter can.3"s
A bylaw would be invalid only if it were inconsistent with the law or
the charter. The court suggests that the shareholder-proposed bylaw would
be inconsistent with section 141(a)'s grant of power to directors,' 6 but this is
not the case. It is not section 141(a) that requires directors to screen proxy
expenditures; it is their fiduciary duties. However, these fiduciary duties ap-
ply to the directors, not to the shareholders. Thus, fiduciary duties were not
implicated. The proposed bylaw might have been inconsistent with the fidu-
ciary duty rule in question if it had originated with the directors; but it did
not. The proposed bylaw was otherwise valid, and there would be no breach
351 See supra notes 319-320 and accompanying text.
352 See supra Part V.B.
353 CA, 953 A.2d at 240.
354 See supra notes 165-167 and accompanying text.
355 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b) (2011). But see CA, 953 A.2d at 234-35 ("It is well-estab-
lished Delaware law that a proper function of bylaws is not to mandate how the board should decide
specific substantive business decisions, but rather, to define the process and procedures by which those
decisions are made.").
356 See CA, 953 A.2d at 239-40.
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on the part of the shareholders in adopting it. Thus, the bylaw would be valid,
if adopted. It would be binding on the directors, and there would be no breach
of fiduciary duty on their part in complying with it. If anything, it would be
a failure to comply with the bylaw that would result in a breach of fiduciary
duty!
Although we have been speaking of fiduciary duties rather than fiduci-
ary outs, the two are relatively interchangeable. As previously discussed, fi-
duciary outs are contractual proxies for fiduciary duties."' In fact, the court
suggests that a fiduciary out may have saved the proposed bylaw: the court
noted that "the Bylaw contains no language or provision that would reserve
to CA's directors their full power to exercise their fiduciary duty to decide
whether or not it would be appropriate, in a specific case, to award reim-
bursement at all.""58 Although the Article's discussion has been framed in
terms of fiduciary duties, it applies equally to the necessity of a fiduciary out.
The problem with a fiduciary out in this context is that it might create
an option on the part of the directors-one that does not, or at least should
not, exist otherwise. A fiduciary out would seem to authorize directors to
refrain from making a payment thereunder if they felt that their fiduciary du-
ties prevented them from doing so. Their judgment on this issue would not
be second-guessed by the courts, and the decision would be subject to rever-
sal only if it were itself (proven to be) a breach of fiduciary duty.359 By con-
trast, in the absence of a fiduciary out, directors presumably would have less
freedom to ignore the bylaw. It would be challenging to establish that they
should not have to pay a valid obligation because their fiduciary duties pre-
vent them from doing so-especially given their inherent conflict of inter-
est.3 60 Thus, even if it were granted that valid obligations could be avoided
because of directors' fiduciary duties, it nevertheless was inappropriate to
require a fiduciary out. The device itself inappropriately shifts the burden of
proof from the directors onto the shareholders.
Ultimately, the Delaware General Assembly reversed this part of the
Supreme Court's decision when it promulgated section 113 to the General
Corporation Law. 36 1 However, this Article is not about shareholder access. It
is about the legitimacy of fiduciary out provisions. Even though the CA case
may have no continuing effect on the development of shareholder access
rules, its reasoning could have serious repercussions for the development of
the law of fiduciary outs. Therefore, it is important to understand that the
357 See supra note I18 and accompanying text.
358 CA, 953 A.2d at 240.
359 Ofcourse, "[a] decision by directors to deny reimbursement on fiduciary grounds would be judi-
cially reviewable." Id. at 240 n.35. However, as discussed in Part IV, supra, fiduciary outs are interpreted
consistently with the standards of conduct rather than the standards of review and thus necessarily give to
directors a great deal of discretion to decide, albeit in good faith, upon the appropriate course of action.
See supra text accompanying notes 123-132.
360 See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
361 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 113 (2011).
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court was wrong not simply as a policy matter, but as a matter of law and
equity.
CONCLUSION
The fiduciary out is a curious and inherently problematic device. It is
virtually ubiquitous in the context of acquisition agreements but almost un-
heard of in other contexts. Although it is not intended to do so, it almost
necessarily transforms an agreement into an option in the hands of one party.
Nevertheless, fiduciary outs make sense in the context of acquisition
agreements. The key to understanding why and how they do is to recognize
that fiduciary outs are contractual proxies for fiduciary duties. As such, they
should be interpreted consistently with the general purpose of fiduciary du-
ties: to protect shareholders from abuse at the hands of directors. Fiduciary
outs do this in the context of acquisition agreements by protecting the right
of the shareholders to vote against the transaction in question against inter-
ference by the directors.
However, this rationale does not extend beyond the context of acquisi-
tion agreements. Shareholders do not have the right to manage the business
and affairs of the corporation and therefore do not have the right to vote on
almost any other contract. Thus, although fiduciary outs should remain per-
missible in the context of acquisition agreements, they should not be ex-
tended to any other context.
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